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Phillip M. Saunders* Getting Their Feet Wet: The
Supreme Court And Practical
Implementation Of Treaty Rights
In The Marshall Case
Judicial decisions which recognize aboriginal or treaty rights to natural resources
inevitably lead on to a process of negotiation, as governments and aboriginal and
other users of the resource define the access and management regimes which
allow for practical implementation of the legal rights. Courts should be cognizant
of the impact of their decisions on such negotiations, and provide adequate clarity
and substantive guidance to negotiators. This article considers the decisions of
the Supreme Court of Canada in the Marshall case from this perspective, and
details the shortcomings which made the prospects for successful negotiations
less favourable. The weaknesses in the Court's judgments in this case provide the
basis for some suggested changes in approach.
Les d6cisions juridiques reconnaissant les droits des autochtones ou les droits
issus des trait6s concernant I'acces aux ressources naturelles d6bouchent
in6vitablement sur un processus de n6gociation faisant intervenir les divers
paliers de gouvernement, la communaut6 autochtone et les autres utilisateurs de
la ressource pour mettre au point les conditions d'acces et le r6gime de gestion
de la ressource qui permettront la mise en application des droits reconnus par la
cour. Les tribunaux doivent 6tre sensibles a I'impact de leurs decisions sur des
n6gociations semblables et formuler des d6cisions claires qui donnent des
reperes concrets aux n6gociateurs. L'auteur examine les decisions de la Cour
supreme dans le dossier Marshall; il cerne les lacunes qui ont entrav6 le travail
des n6gociateurs et propose des changements a I'approche utilis6e.
* Associate Professor, Dalhousie Law School, Halifax, Nova Scotia. This article benefited
from the very helpful comments and suggestions of a number of colleagues, including in
particular Professors Stephen Coughlan and Wayne MacKay of Dalhousie Law School. All
opinions expressed, and of course any errors or omisions, are those of the author.
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Any intransigence at the bargaining table on the part of governments or,
for that matter, Native groups, will be recorded by the eyes and ears in the
Supreme Court building. The message from the Supreme Court of Canada
seems clear. Those who fail to negotiate in good faith may reap the
whirlwind.'
Introduction
On 17 September 1999 the Supreme Court of Canada delivered its
decision in the case of R. v. Marshall,2 confirming the existence of a
Mi'kmaq3 treaty right to trade in the products of fishing, hunting and
gathering under a series of treaties made with the British Crown in 1760-
61, and overturning a conviction4 against Donald Marshall Jr. for
illegally fishing and selling eels.5 By November 17, in an extraordinary
turn of events, the Court was dealing with the matter again, denying a
motion for rehearing and stay by the intervener West Nova Fishermen's
Coalition, a motion premised on the need for clarification of certain
questions arising from the first decision. 6
In the intervening months, and to a lesser extent in the period since the
second ruling, the response to the Marshall decision in the East Coast
fishing industry involved a degree of confusion, acrimony and violence
which has not attached to previous decisions of the Court on aboriginal
or treaty rights.7 The fact that the first decision closely preceded the
1. W.I.C. Binnie, "The Sparrow Doctrine: Beginning of the End or End of the Beginning?"
(1990) 15 Queen's L.J. 217 at 242 [hereinafter "The Sparrow Doctrine"].
2. [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, 177 D.L.R. (4th) 513 [hereinafter Marshall #1]. "MarshaIr or the
"Marshall case" will be used to refer to the entire course of the litigation.
3. The spelling "Mi'kmaq" is used here for convenience, as it was used in the decisions. Other
usages include the use of "Mfkmaq" as plural and "Mikmaw" as singular: see J.Y. Henderson,
"Mfkmaw Tenure in Atlantic Canada" (1995) 18 Dal. L.J. 196 at 198, note 8 [hereinafter
"Mikmaw Tenure"]. See also Chief D. Marshall Sr., Grand Captain A. Denny & Putus S.
Marshall, "The Mi'kmaq: The Covenant Chain" in B. Henderson, ed., Drumbeat: Anger and
Renewal in Indian Country (Toronto: Summerhill Press, 1989) 71-104 at 76.
4. R. v. Marshall, [19961 N.S.J. No. 246 (Prov. Ct.) online: QL(NSJ) [hereinafter Marshall:
Prov. Ct.]. The various treaties of relevance to this case are included as appendices to this
decision, including the following: Treaty of 1726 (App. Ill); Treaty of 1752 (App. IV);
Maliseet and Passamaquoddy Treaty of February 1760 (App. V); Treaty of March 1760 with
LaHave Mi'kmaq (App. VI).
5. The trial decision had been upheld by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal: R. v. Marshall
(D.J.), Jr. (1997), 159 N.S.R. (2d) 186; 468 A.P.R. 186 (N.S.C.A.) thereinafter Marshall:
C.A.].
6. R. v.Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533 at para. 10, 179 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [hereinafterMarshall
#21.
7. See e.g., J. DeMont, "Beyond Burnt Church" Maclean's (18 October 1999) 34 at 34-35
[hereinafter "Beyond Burnt Church"]; "A Fishery on the Boil" Maclean's (25 October 1999)
45 at 45 [hereinafter "A Fishery on the Boil"].
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opening of the lobster season, one of the more valuable remaining
fisheries in Atlantic Canada, may have raised the stakes in this case. A
long history of exclusion of the Mi'kmaq from many resource-based
industries, coupled with fears related to an industry and communities in
decline, certainly played a role in some localities, as did media and
political actors pursuing their own, independent agendas.' It is, however,
simplistic to ascribe all of the resulting tension to such factors. Other
valuable resources have been affected by previous decisions without
similar consequences, and a number of individuals and communities, on
both sides of the issue, made good faith efforts to move towards accom-
modation and compromise in the highly charged atmosphere surrounding
the implementation of Marshall.9
Much of the conflict following on from the September 17 decision
arose from the wide divergence of views on what the Supreme Court had
meant when it defined the treaty right. It was obvious to all parties that
negotiations would be required to implement the judgment in practical
terms, 0 but there was little or no agreement on the actual impact of the
decision on precisely those issues that would require negotiation, includ-
ing such critical elements as the geographic scope of the treaty right and
the range of resources affected. This lack of common ground created
serious obstacles to the initiation of coherent negotiations.
This aspect of the Marshall case provides the starting point for this
article. It seems clear to all involved, including the Court," that negotia-
tions are by far the preferable means of reaching settlements on disputes
relating to aboriginal rights and treaties. Even where litigation has
8. For a discussion of some of the hostile press coverage, and the public condemnation of the
decision by some provincial premiers, see R.L. Barsh and J.Y. Henderson, "Marshalling the
Rule of Law in Canada: Of Eels and Honour" (1999) 11 Constitutional Forum 1 at 11-12, 13
[hereinafter "Of Eels and Honour"]. In the House of Commons the Reform Party (as it then was)
took a particularly active interest in the matter, taking the opportunity to connect the decision
in Marshall #1 to the Nisga'a treaty in British Columbia and a generalized concern about
"where this country is going": see e.g., House of Commons Debates (13 October 1999) at 1305
(B. Gilmour). The release of Marshall #1 during continuing debate on the Nisga'a deal may
have contributed to the interest of some parties in aggressively pursuing this issue.
9. In addition to negotiations with government, a separate track developed between aboriginal
leaders and non-native fishing groups. See e.g., 33 Canadian News Facts (1999) at 5931.
Among those calling for compromise on interim arrangements was Mr. Marshall himself: J.
DeMont, "Lobster Wars" Maclean's (11 October, 1999) 20 at 20.
10. The federal government appointed a negotiator on Oct. 15, who was responsible for
brokering interim deals with the various band authorities: 33 Canadian News Facts (1999) at
5939; see also Assembly of First Nations Press Release of Oct. 1, 1999, "National Chief
Welcomes Government Offer to Negotiate Peaceful Resolution to Fishery Dispute" [herein-
after "National Chief Welcomes Government Offer"].
11. See Part I "Sui Generis Treaties; Sui Generis Decisions," below.
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resulted, it is inevitable that post-judgment negotiations will be required
to implement the adjudicated rights in practical detail. These negotiations
may involve lawyers (as, some might complain, does everything else),
but for cases involving natural resources much of the content of the
discussions will be concerned with creating an acceptable management
regime to deal with such fundamental matters as the priority allocation of
access, the geographic and temporal scope of that access, the range of
permissible technological and other limits on exploitation, and the
myriad of other factors that make up a complete resource management
system.
This examination of the Marshall case is directed primarily to the
relationship between the Court's work and the requirements of the
subsequent process of implementation through negotiation. The funda-
mental question is how, and how well, the Court provides guidance and
direction to the negotiation process, and what the experience of Marshall
says about ways in which this might be done better. It is not intended to
pursue the various doctrinal debates surrounding the interpretation of
aboriginal treaties, as the discussion proceeds from the starting point of
accepting the principles developed in previous cases, nor is there any
detailed consideration of the whether the Court was "correct" in finding
the right in this matter.1 2 Furthermore, this review is largely restricted to
the issues which arose on the facts of this case; there are other arguments
relating to the interpretation of treaties in Atlantic Canada which are still
very much alive and which were not settled within the factual confines of
the Marshall case. These include such matters as the general applicability
12. The question of infringement is considered in Parts II and III, in that it is more closely
connected to the issue of guidance for negotiators.
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of the Treaty of 1752,1 which was effectively removed from the case by
the defence at trial, 4 and even broader assertions about the concept of a
"Covenant Chain" of treaties, an argument which did not become part of
this case.' 5 Further arguments also exist about the presence of an
aboriginal right to trade, as distinct from the treaty right claimed in
Marshall, and the impact of movementtowards self-government.16 None
of what follows is intended to express a view on these and other issues
beyond the narrow boundaries of the Marshall case itself.
13. The Treaty of 1752 was the subject of Simon v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387 [hereinafter
Simon]. This Treaty was concluded between Governor Hopson of Nova Scotia and Major Jean
Baptiste Cope (at 392-93), who was described by the Supreme Court, at 407, as "Chief of the
Shubenacadie Micmac tribe". There have been claims that the treaty may be more broadly
applicable throughout the traditional Mi'kmaq territory. Wildsmith has suggested that inter-
marriage and movement of the Mi'kmaq since the 18th century means that rights under specific
treaties might be made more generally applicable: B. Wildsmith, "The Mi'kmaq and the
Fishery: Beyond Food Requirements" (1995) 18 Dal. L.J. 116 at 123 [hereinafter "The
Mi'kmaq and the Fishery"]. Henderson argues more directly that Cope and his delegates "were
formally recognized as the proper representatives of the Mikmaw Nation", and refers to Cope
as "Grand Chief' of the "Mikmaw Nation": "Mfkmaw Tenure", supra note 3 at 252-53. This
latter argument, however, is in conflict with the record of the initial discussions with Cope,
which indicates that he did not make this claim for himself, but rather that he would attempt
to draw in the other Chiefs: see T. Akins, ed., Selections from the Public Documents of the
Province of Nova Scotia (Halifax: Charles Annand, 1869) at 671, extracted in R.H. Whitehead,
The Old Man Told Us: Excerpts From Micmac History 1500-1950 (Halifax: Nimbus,1991) at
123. The impression of a narrower authority is enhanced by the inclusion of the obligation to
bring in other Chiefs in the actual treaty: see Simon, ibid. at 393. See also the discussion at S.E.
Patterson, "Indian-White Relations in Nova Scotia, 1749-61: A Study in Political Interaction"
(1993) 23 Acadiensis 23 at 38-39 [hereinafter "Indian-White Relations"]. For a discussion of
late 19th and early 20th century Mi'kmaq perspectives on the validity of the 1752 Treaty, see
W.C. Wicken, "'Heard It From Our Grandfathers': Mi' kmaq Treaty Tradition and the Syliboy
Case of 1928" (1995) 44 U.N.B.L.J. 145 at 148-51, 153-54 [hereinafter "Mi'kmaq Treaty
Tradition"].
14. See infra note 58.
15. By this interpretation, earlier and later treaties are connected to form an overall package
of obligations. See Marshall, Denny & Marshall, supra note 3 at 83, where the Treaties of 1760-
6 t are referred to as "accessions" to the 1752 Treaty. See also "Mtkmaw Tenure", supra note
3 at 257-58, and "The Mi'kmaq and the Fishery", supra note 13 at 117, 123. Fora contrary view,
contesting the existence of such a "chain" on the historical evidence, see S.E. Patterson,
"Anatomy of a Treaty: Nova Scotia's First Native Treaty in Historical Context" (1999) 48
U.N.B.L.J. 41 at 63-64 [hereinafter "Anatomy of A Treaty"].
16. See "The Mi'kmaq and the Fishery", supra note 13 at 124-26, 132-36. Barsh &
Henderson referto the majority's "failure to distinguish between an Aboriginal right to fish and
a treaty right to fish, both of which can legitimately be asserted by the Mi'kmaq", but this
ignores the fact that the Court did not have before it any defence based on an aboriginal right
to fish: "Of Eels and Honour", supra note 8 at 8, note 74. Both aboriginal title and aboriginal
rights to fish and trade were asserted, but rejected on the facts, in the post-Marshall case of R.
v. Bernard, [2000] N.B.J. No. 138 at paras. 88, 107-10 (Prov. Ct.) online: QL(NBJ) [hereinafter
Bernard], which also dealt again with the 1760-61 Treaties, at paras. 72-87.
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I. Sui Generis Treaties; Sui Generis Decisions
The Supreme Court has long recognised treaties between the Crown and
aboriginal nations as a unique form of agreement, to which usual
principles of international law (or contract law) cannot be readily applied.
In the words of Chief Justice Dickson in Simon, a treaty of this type "is
unique; it is an agreement sui generis which is neither created nor
terminated according to the rules of international law," 7 and this charac-
teristic of the treaties means that they must be subject to special rules of
interpretation. This and other interpretive principles applicable to ab-
original treaties were summarised by McLachlin J. in the dissent in
Marshall #1,18 including the following:
1. Treaties should be given a "fair, large and liberal construction", 9
with "doubtful expression" or ambiguity resolved in favour of the
aboriginal parties;2"
2. Treaty interpretation must choose "from among the various
possible interpretations of common intention the one which best recon-
ciles the interests of both parties at the time";21
3. The "honour of the Crown" is to be presumed in finding common
intention, and indeed more generally the interpretation of treaties, and of
legislative instruments which affect rights granted under them, "must be
approached in a manner which maintains the integrity of the Crown"
in the sense that it is "assumed that the Crown intends to fulfil its
promises";22
17. Simon, supra note 13 at 404; R. v. Sioui, [ 199011 S.C.R. 1025 at 1043 [hereinafter Sioui].
See generally: J.Y. Henderson, "Interpreting Sui Generis Treaties" (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 46
[hereinafter "Sui Generis Treaties "]; LI. Rotman, "Defining Parameters: Aboriginal Rights,
Treaty Rights and the Sparrow Justificatory Test (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 149 [hereinafter
"Defining Parameters"]. The use of "uniqueness" as a defining term has led to some concern
that it leaves too much room for ambiguity and subjectivity, as expressed in the following
comment about its use with respect to aboriginal rights:
[T]he... description (really a non-description) of Aboriginal rights as sui generis is
wholly the creation of our own Supreme Court. The description, first coined in Guerin,
has been repeated in subsequent cases as if repetition will make it into a definition as
opposed to an adamant refusal to essay a definition. [footnotes deleted]
"The Sparrow Doctrine", supra note I at 221-22, referring to Guerin v. R., [ 1984] 2 S.C.R. 335
at 382.
18. Supra note 2 at para. 78.
19. Simon, supra note 13 at 402.
20. Nowegijick v. R., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29 at 36 [hereinafter Nowegijick].
21. Marshall#l, supra note 2 at para. 78.
22. Ibid., and R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 at para. 41 [hereinafter Badger].
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4. Courts must take account of the historical context of treaty
negotiation, and in particular the fact that the treaties "were the product
of negotiation between very different cultures", so that the language may
not reflect "with total accuracy each parties understanding of their
effect", 23 especially in light of differing linguistic traditions;
24
5. Words in a treaty should be given "the sense they would naturally
have held for the parties at the time", 25 and should not be "subjected to
rigid modem rules of construction" ;26
6. Generous interpretation does not extend to changing the terms of
the treaty, and courts must choose "from among the various interpreta-
tions the one which best reconciles" the interests of the parties;
27
7. Treaty rights are not "frozen in time", but must be interpreted to
allow for their modern evolution.28
The Court has also developed a process through which the treaty
interpretation principles are to be applied, a process which sets out a series
of steps which are themselves defined by additional principles. The four
basic steps to be followed in the examination of a claimed treaty right,
which were set out in the aboriginal rights context in Sparrow29 and
subsequently applied to treaties,3" were summarised as follows in
Gladstone:
In Sparrow... Dickson C.J. and La Forest J. ... held that an analysis of
a claim under s. 35(1) has four steps: first, the court must determine
whether an applicant has demonstrated that he or she was acting pursuant
to an aboriginal right; second, a court must determine whether that right
was extinguished prior to the enactment of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982; third, a court must determine whether that right has been infringed;
finally, a court must determine whether that infringement was justified.31
The first stage, for which the onus is on the claimant of the right, requires
the establishment of a "treaty right that protects, expressly or by infer-
ence, the activities in question".32 Should the Crown claim the termina-
tion or extinguishment of the right, however, they bear the onus to show
this, and this burden can only be satisfied "by strict proof .33 The claimant
23. R. v. Horseman, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901 at 907 [hereinafter Horseman].
24. Badger, supra note 22 at para. 52.
25. Marshall #1, supra note 2 at para. 78.
26. Badger, supra note 22 at para. 52.
27. Sioui, supra note 17 at 1069.
28. R. v. Sundown, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 393 at para. 32 [hereinafter Sundown]. This requirement
was drawn directly from the aboriginal rights context: R. v. Sparrow, [199011 S.C.R. 1075 at
1093 [hereinafter Sparrow].
29. Sparrow, ibid. at 111 I-19.
30. See e.g., Badger, supra note 22 at 86-95, 96.
31. R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 at para. 20 [hereinafter Gladstone].
32. Marshall#l, supra note 2 at para. Ill ,perMcLachlin J. in dissent [emphasis in original].
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again bears the burden of showing that the governmental action, normally
legislation,3 4 constitutes aprimafacie infringement of the right. The test
for prima facie infringement set out in Sparrow, and applied as well to
treaties,35 requires the court to ask a number of questions:
To determine whether the... rights have been interfered with such as to
constitute a primafacie infringement of s. 35(1), certain questions must be
asked. First, is the limitation unreasonable? Second, does the regulation
impose undue hardship? Third, does the regulation deny to the holders of
the right their preferred means of exercising that right? The onus of
proving a prima facie infringement lies on the individual or group
challenging the legislation.3 6
The test has been subject to some subsequent clarification which has
made it clear that these questions "do not define the concept ofprimafacie
infringement; they only point to factors which will indicate that such an
infringement has taken place."37
The final stage of justification, for which the burden of proof is on the
Crown, involves a two-part inquiry focusing first on whether the govern-
ment can "demonstrate that it was acting pursuant to a valid legislative
objective"38 which was "compelling and substantial",39 and, second, that
in pursuit of its objectives the Crown has also "acted in a way consistent
with upholding the honour of the Crown and its fiduciary obligation to
Aboriginal people."4° A finding on the latter issue may involve consid-
eration of a number of additional issues, including priority of allocation,
whether there has been as "little impairment as possible" to achieve the
objective, the availability of compensation and whether there has been
33. Sioui, supra note 17 at 1061, citing with approval Simon, supra note 13 at 405-06.
34. It has been argued that the Court has moved from a notion of infringement as primarily
a narrow regulatory issue, to a broader conception including virtually any governmental
actions: see L. Dufraimont, "From Regulation to Recolonization: Justifiable Infringement of
Aboriginal Rights at the Supreme Court of Canada" (2000) 58 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. I at 22-23.
35. See e.g., Badger, supra note 22 at para. 37; R. v. Cot, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139 at para. 33
[hereinafter Cotd].
36. Sparrow, supra note 28 at 1112.
37. Gladstone, supra note 31 at para. 43, where Lamer C.J.C. also addressed the possibility
that wording such as "undue hardship" in Sparrow required more than a "meaningful
diminution" of the right, and confirmed that nothing more was required to show an infringe-
ment. In addition, he clarified that the questions in Sparrow were simply pointing to "factors
which will indicate that such an infringement has taken place".
38. Ibid. at para. 54
39. Sparrow, supra note 28 at 1113.
40. "The Mi'kmaq and the Fishery", supra note 13 at 129.
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consultation with affected aboriginal groups about the measures im-
posed.41
The possibility of justification of infringements of constitutionally
protected aboriginal and treaty rights, which is of course not apparent in
the combined effect of sections 35(1) and 52 of the Constitution Act,
1982,42 has given rise to significant amounts of commentary and contro-
versy. The debate has produced an extensive list of concerns: the
propriety of "watering down" constitutional rights and thus removing any
real "protection" they might have had; 3 the conceptual problem of
unilateral modification of rights provided for under consensual agree-
ments (in the case of treaty rights);" the dangers of consequentialist
reasoning that permits the dilution of rights in the face of inevitable
results that the Court might find unpalatable;45 the threat of perceived
expansions of the possibilities available under Sparrow, as more flexible
versions of "compelling and substantial" objectives are developed.4 6 On
the other side, there is the view (inherent in the Court's approach) that
pragmatism dictates there be the possibility of balancing competing
interests in the lands and resources in question, and that justification of
intrusions forms part of a package with the relatively flexible interpretive
41. Sparrow, supra note 28 at 1119. See also: Dufraimont, supra note 34 at 7-8; "The
Mi'kmaq and the Fishery", supra note 13 at 129-30; S. Lawrence & P. Macklem, "From
Consultation To Reconciliation: Aboriginal Rights and the Crown's Duty to Consult" (2000)
79 Can. Bar Rev. 252 at 255-59.
42. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
s. 35(l) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are
hereby recognized and affirmed.
s. 52 The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency,
of no force or effect.
43. "Of Eels and Honour", supra note 8 at 17:
The only proper test for a constitutional right is inconsistency, as it is explicitly set out
in s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. The courts have been charged constitutionally
with the duty of determining consistency and nullifying "laws" that are not consistent
with fundamental rights.
44. For a full discussion of this issue, see "Defining Parameters", supra note 17 at 152-58.
The justification test from Sparrow was explicitly adopted for treaties in Badger, supra note
22 at paras 74-85.
45. D. Newman, "The Limitation Of Rights: A Comparative Evolution and Ideology of the
Oakes and Sparrow Tests" (1999) 62 Sask. L. Rev. 543, passim.
46. See the discussion on the expansion of the potential list of objectives in Dufraimont, supra
note 34 at 8-12. See also: Gladstone, supra note 31 at para. 75 on the acceptability of an
objective of "pursuit of regional and economic fairness"; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,
[ 1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 at para. 165 [hereinafter Delgamuukw], dealing with general objectives
of economic development. Dufraimont, ibid. at 9, refers to the Delgarmuukw formulation as "a
veritable celebration of public interest-based limitations on Aboriginal rights."
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principles applied in defining the rights.47 This debate over the applicable
principles is, as noted earlier, beyond the scope of the question under
consideration here, and indeed justification was never directly dealt with
in the Marshall case, in light of the fact that the Crown did not call
evidence on the issue at trial. The principles and process utilised in treaty
interpretation are, however, relevant to the question of practical guidance
for the conduct of negotiations on treaty implementation, and may have
been developed partly with that task in mind.
The Supreme Court has, from the early s. 35 cases onward, been quite
frank about two fundamental characteristics of the issues that confronted
them. First, there has been repeated acknowledgement of the fact that
these complex, multi-faceted problems of rights and resource manage-
ment are not particularly amenable to resolution by litigation,48 and that
negotiation is by far the preferred option, as reaffirmed by the Court in
Marshall #2:
As this and other courts have pointed out on many occasions, the process
of accommodation of the treaty right may best be resolved by consultation
and negotiation of a modem agreement for participation in specified
resources by the Mi'kmaq rather than by litigation. 9
This concern, which is reflected in "repeated judicial calls for First
Nations and the Crown not to tax the institutional competence of the
judiciary by excessive litigation of disputes", 0 is directly linked to the
second point which has been recognised by the Supreme Court; their
jurisprudence on these issues will inevitably be used to inform and
structure the negotiation process which they see as necessary. This view
was concisely expressed in Sparrow, where the Court noted that "s. 35(1)
47. See e.g., "The Sparrow Doctrine", supra note I at 218:
The checks and balances of the Constitution .. . do not favour both a "liberal and
generous" reading of the rights and a high level of immunity. The Supreme Court
attaches great importance to flexibility in a constitutional document to meet changing
conditions. Having erected something of a legal fortress around section 35 rights, it will
now be cautious and somewhat circumspect in identifying the specific activities that
belong within the fortress.
48. The nature of the problem has been summarized by Lawrence & Macklem, supra note 41
at 257-58 as follows:
The Court's call for negotiated settlements is especially significant given the detailed
and complex political, economic, jurisdictional, and remedial judgments necessary to
resolve competing claims to territory and authority.... Negotiation permits parties to
address each other's real needs and reach complex and mutually agreeable trade-offs.
49. Delgamuukw, supra note 46 at para. 207, per La Forest J.: "[I] wish to emphasize that the
best approach in these types of cases is a process of negotiation and reconciliation that properly
considers the complex and competing interests at stake", quoted with approval at Marshall #2,
supra note 6 at para. 22.
50. Lawrence & Macklem, supra note 41 at 254.
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. provides a solid constitutional base upon which subsequent. negotia-
tions can take place"'" More recently the point was confirmed in
Delgamuukw, where Lamer C.J.C. noted that the broader purpose of
reconciliation in s. 35(1) will only be achieved "through negotiated
settlements, with good faith and give and take on all sides, reinforced by
the judgments of this Court". 2
In practical terms, this means that decisions of the Supreme Court on
aboriginal and treaty rights are, if not unique, at least distinctive in the
purpose they serve and the audience to which they are directed. Consti-
tutional jurisprudence is usually thought of as sending messages to the
courts, in the form of precedent, and legislatures, through guidance about
the acceptable limits of legislative action. Section 35(1) cases, although
fulfilling these two purposes as well, are additionally required to provide
substantive guidance to multiple parties (government, aboriginal peoples
and other users of affected resources) on the structuring of the negotia-
tions which the Court has identified as essential to completion of the
process. This has important implications for how a right and its degree of
permissible regulation are defined; close attention must be paid to
defining at least those elements of the right which will permit the
subsequent development of a management regime, and to doing so in a
manner which will be clearly understood by those who must carry out this
task. For the relatively narrow circumstances of rights to use of particular
resources (as opposed to broader title claims) these elements would
include at least such fundamentals as the identity of individuals with
access to a resource, allocation priorities, geographic scope, resources
affected and the substantive scope of allowable management measures.
The process and principles developed by the Supreme Court, beyond
their primary use in reaching decisions on the particulars of the cases, also
provide the basis for the setting out the necessary guidance for negotia-
tors, as discussed above. The process,. with its sequential steps, requires
the concrete definition of the substantive scope of the right at the outset,
which should allow its parameters to be adequately delineated for the
purpose of assessing the range of entitlements. A finding of prima facie
infringement obviously allows for at least a partial determination, al-
though limited by the particular facts, of the level of government
regulation (and thus management measures) which might be considered
acceptable without further justification. The justification stage allows
additional information on this issue to be provided, and indeed it has been
suggested that part of the thinking underlying the development of the
51. Sparrow, supra note 28 at 1105.
52. Delgamuukw, supra note 46 at para. 186 [emphasis added].
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Sparrow test was to permit the Court to influence the course of negotia-
tions, both through the details of decisions and the broader impact of
putting parties on notice that the Court has the ultimate capability to
intervene and construct "solutions" for the parties. 3
The principles developed by the Court also have an important role to
play in providing the basis for negotiations. For example, the emphasis
on the presence of a fiduciary duty can be expected to influence what is
meant by "negotiations in good faith". A related principle, the duty to
consult, has potentially significant implications for what sorts of govern-
ment regulation might be considered acceptable, and larger creative
possibilities in encouraging a greater degree of cooperative management
approaches.14 It should be noted that the application of these principles
should not be restricted to post-litigation negotiations which flow on from
a particular court decision such as Marshall, but rather should be applied
consistently in all negotiations whether precipitated by litigation or not.
The circumstances of Marshall were such that this article is focussed on
the post-litigation model, but the long-term contribution of these prin-
ciples to the conduct of negotiations outside the context of litigation
should not be forgotten.55
53. See e.g., the following observation by Binnie J., prior to his appointment to the Court:
The Sparrowjudgment is nothing if not candid about the Court's strategy .... The Court,
quite rightly, does not say where the solution lies, but it has made it clear that in-its
opinion there must be a negotiated settlement .... This aspect of Sparrow seems clear.
Section 35 may not itself be the solution, but it can become the Court's vehicle to force
a political settlement of the issues.
"The Sparrow Doctrine", supra note I at 221.
54. On the scope and nature of this duty, and the potential for an interpretation that goes
beyond its use as an expostfacto element ofjustification to encourage and enhance consultation
in all cases of anticipated government intrusion on aboriginal and treaty rights, see Lawrence
& Macklein, supra note 41 at 254-55 and 267-78.
55. It is, of course, true that this requires a high degree of good faith on both sides, but this
does not negate the potential significance of this use of the jurisprudence:
Given the stakes involved, litigation will never disappear from view in cases involving
the assertion of Aboriginal title. But the law ought to create incentives on the parties to
first attempt to reach negotiated outcomes that define their respective rights.
Ibid. at 279.
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II. The Judgments in R. v. Marshall
1. The Facts
Mr. Marshall was charged with three separate offences under the Fisher-
ies Act and its regulations: fishing for eels without a licence, fishing
during a close time for eels with prohibited nets, and selling or offering
to sell eels caught outside the authority of an appropriate licence.56 The
trial proceeded on the basis of an agreed statement of facts with respect
to both the elements of the offences for which Mr. Marshall was charged
and matters relating to his status. It was agreed that Mr. Marshall and
another person had fished for eels with a fyke net in Pomquet Harbour,
Nova Scotia, that they had landed and kept those eels on lands which are
part of Afton First Nation, and that the eels had then been sold to a
commercial operator. It was further agreed that Mr. Marshall did not have
any relevant licence for this activity and that the date in question was a
close time for fishing eels at that location. Finally, it was agreed that Mr.
Marshall is a "status Mi'kmaq Indian registered under the provisions of
the Indian Act" and "a member of the Membertou Band" near Sydney."
The defence to the charges was based on the contention that Mr. Marshall
had, pursuant to a "trade clause" in Treaties concluded between the
Mi'kmaq and the British in 1760-61, a constitutionally protected "right
to fish and to sell the fish."58 This trade clause, which was common to the
various treaties, provided as follows:
And I do further engage that we will not traffick, barter or exchange any
commodities in any manner but with such persons or the managers of such
truckhouses as shall be appointed or established by His Majesty's Gover-
nor at [truckhouse location closest to the village in question] or elsewhere
in Nova Scotia or Accadia. 9
56. Maritime Provinces Fishery Regulations, S.O.R./93-55, ss. 4(1), 5,20; Fishery (General)
Regulations, S.O.R./93-53, s. 35(2); Aboriginal Communal Fishing Licences Regulations,
S.O.R./93-332, s. 4; Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14, s. 78, as am. by S.C. 1991, c. 1, s. 24.
57. Marshall: Prov. Ct., supra note 4 at para. 4.
58. Ibid. at paras. 6-7. Although the defence at trial originally included the Treaty of 1752,
the admission of further evidence of termination by hostilities (beyond what was heard in
Simon, supra note 13) led to the withdrawal of the 1752 argument from consideration along
with other potential sources of the right, including aboriginal rights, the Treaties of 1725-26
and Belcher's Proclamation of 1762: Marshall: Prov. Ct., supra note 4 at paras. 18, 130;
Marshall #1, supra note 2 at para. 16. The earlier treaties were argued at the Court of Appeal
with respect to their possible incorporation in the 1760-61 Treaties, but this was rejected:
Marshall: CA., supra note 5 at paras. 28-42. The majority in Marshall #1 took the line that they
were "not called upon to consider the 1752 Treaty in the present appeal", although McLachlin
J. (as she then was), did address contextual arguments related to the 1752 document in the
dissent: Marshall #1, ibid. at paras. 16, 105-06.
59. Marshall: Prov. Ct., ibid. at para. 113.
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2. The Trial Decision
In addition to the agreed facts, the trial judge, Embree Prov. Ct. J. made
a number of findings of fact and law with respect to the treaties. After a
lengthy review of the historical background 6° and the initial negotiations
with the Maliseet and Passamaquoddy, 6 he concluded that in a period
beginning in early 1760 and ending late in 1761, "all Mi'kmaq in Nova
Scotia had entered into separate but similar treaties" which (despite some
variations) were "materially the same" as the first, which had been
concluded with the LaHave and Richibucto Mi'kmaq.62 He also found
that the treaties were "valid treaties in law", having been concluded by
qualified representatives on both sides, and in a manner that demon-
strated "the existence of an intention to create obligations, the presence
of mutually binding obligations and the necessary degree of solemnity",
the characteristics of a valid treaty set out in Sioui.63 Finally, after an
examination of the record of negotiations and surrounding context, he
concluded that the written treaties contained "all the promises made and
all the terms and conditions mutually agreed to."'
On the critical question of interpretation arising from the Treaties the
defence contended that the truckhouse clause, although on its face a
negative restriction on Mi'kmaq trade, should be interpreted in light of
the prior negotiations and the historical background, in particular the
British understanding of the Mi'kmaq way of life at the time, and that this
interpretation confirmed a "right to fish and the right to sell fish" under
the treaty.65 Judge Embree accepted as "inherent in these treaties that the
British recognised and accepted the existing Mi'krnaq way of life", and
that the "trade clause in the 1760-61 Treaties gave the Mi'kmaq the right
to bring the products of their hunting, fishing and gathering to a truckhouse
to trade. ,66 He also found, however, that this limited right was "rooted in
the circumstances that existed at that time", when the British were trying
to control Mi'kmaq trade with the recently defeated French, and that after
60. The trial involved a huge volume of testimony and documentary evidence: 34 days of
expert testimony; over 5,800 pages of transcripts; and over 400 documents including numerous
historical records: W.C. Wicken, "R. v. Donald Marshall, Jr., 1993-1996" (1998)28 Acadiensis
8 at 14; see also Marshall: Prov. Ct., supra note 4 at para. 11.
61. The Maliseet and Passamaquoddy involved lived in the Saint John River valley and the
Passamaquoddy Bay area in what is now New Brunswick: Marshall #1, supra note 2
(Appellant's factum at para. 15) [hereinafter Appellant's Factum].
62. Marshall: Prov. Ct., supra note 4 at paras. 69-70.
63. Ibid. at para. 81; Sioui, supra note 17 at 1044.
64. Marshall: Prov. Ct., ibid at para. 112.
65. Ibid. at para. 114.
66. Ibid. at para. 116 [emphasis added].
Getting Their Feet Wet: The Supreme Court and Practical Implementation of 63
Treaty Rights in the Marshallcase
the elimination of the restriction on trade and the demise of the truckhouses
within a few years, "no further trade right" arose from the trade clause.6
7
3. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, primarily on
the basis of its conclusion that the trial judge had applied the proper
interpretive principles, and that he had not erred in law in concluding that
"the wording of the truckhouse clause ... interpreted in its historical
context, did not bear the meaning ascribed to it by the appellants."68 In
addition, it rejected the appellant's argument that the trial judge's finding
of a "right to bring" products for trade at truckhouses resulted in a treaty
infringement through the failure of the Crown to provide either truckhouses
or a similar mechanism, and that this infringement "renders the regula-
tory scheme established by the government.., of no force and effect as
regards the Mi'kmaq. ''69 The Court of Appeal held that this conclusion by
the trial judge had to be read in the context of the right being requested
by the defence, which was a general right to trade resulting from a ight
to trade fish, and in light of his overall interpretation of the truckhouse
provision "as imposing a restriction on Mi'kmaq trading."7 Given this,
and the trial judge's conclusion that "the only implication from the
demise of the truckhouses and licensed traders was that the Mi'kmaq
were free to trade in the same manner as all other residents of the
territory", the Court of Appeal rejected the claim that the trial judge had
"found that the Treaties of 1760-61 granted a treaty right to trade at
truckhouses."71
4. The Supreme Court of Canada #1
Mr. Justice Binnie, writing for the majority in the Supreme Court, 2
reviewed the applicable principles of treaty interpretation, and concluded
that both the trialjudge and the Court of Appeal had erred in law on critical
issues. The majority found that the trial judge had failed to consider
67. Ibid. at para. 125. Accordingly, the trial judge found, at para. 127, that the defendant had
not met his burden of proving the existence of a treaty right which afforded protection to his
activities.
68. Marshall: C.A., supra note 5 at paras. 25-26, 69. The Court of Appeal also rejected
arguments that the trial judge erred in allowing the admission of evidence on the termination
of the Treaty of 1752 (at paras. ,3-99), and in finding that earlier treaties were not incorporated
in the Treaties of 1760-61 (at para. 40).
69. Ibid. at para. 71.
70. Ibid. at paras. 77-78.
71. Ibid. at para. 82.
72. LamerC.J.C., L'Heureux-Dub6, lacobucci and Cory JJ., concurring; McLachlin J. (as she
then was) wrote the dissent, Gonthier J. concurring.
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possible oral promises outside the confines of the written treaties,73 and
that the Court of Appeal erred in rejecting the applicability of extrinsic
evidence in the absence of ambiguity on the face of the treaty, and more
significantly in holding that different treaty interpretation principles
applied to treaties of peace and friendship where no land cession was
involved. 4
Having rejected the findings of the courts below, the majority pro-
ceeded to a review of the historical record of events leading up to the
Treaties of 1760-61, with a particular focus on the negotiations of 1760.
This record was used to support the conclusion that the objectives of the
British included the encouragement of the Mi'kmaq in the maintenance
of their traditional hunting, fishing and gathering activities (including
trade of the products), both to encourage peace and to ensure that they
were able to be self-sustaining, while the Mi'kmaq were concerned to
replace the loss of their French trading partners. 75 The truckhouse clause
was seen as a part of this overall strategy which "would be effective only
if the Mi'kmaq had access both to trade and to the fish and wildlife
resources necessary to provide them with something to trade.
'76
73. Marshall #1, supra note 2 at para. 20. This finding of an error in law at trial is puzzling.
The Court, at para. 19, quotes from the conclusion reached by the trial judge, that no other oral
promises existed, and represents this as the question he asked to reach that conclusion. It is
absolutely clear from the trial decision that the trial judge correctly, and repeatedly, turned his
mind to the possibility of oral promises, as is shown in the following passage:
Were there other statements or promises made orally which the Mi'kmaq considered
were part of these treaties and which have an impact on their meaning? ... Are there
any other aspects of the historical record.., which reflect on the contents or the proper
understanding of the contents of these treaties?
Marshall: Prov. Ct., supra note 4 at para. 92; see also paras. 84-90, 98. It is difficult to see how
the purported error in law can be drawn from this record.
74. Marshall #1, ibid. at paras. 9, 21. The second error, the rejection of treaty interpretation
principles, does not bear close examination. In para. 21 the majority said that the Court of
Appeal "also took the view... that the principles of interpretation of Indian treaties developed
in connection with land cessions are of 'limited specific assistance' to treaties of peace and
friendship .... The same rules of interpretation should apply." In fact, the Court of Appeal did
not say this, but rather the following:
Although the general principles of interpretation enunciated are applicable, these cases
are of limited specific assistance in interpreting the Treaties of 1760-61. In those
Treaties the significant "commodity" exchanged was mutual promises of peace.
Marshall: C.A., supra note 5 at para. 66. The point, which is clear from the surrounding context,
was that one could not simply assume that the conclusions reached by applying the principles
would be the same when the facts were different. The Supreme Court's use of a partial quote
and an inaccurate paraphrasing alters the sense of what the Court of Appeal said.
75. Marshall #1, ibid. at paras. 22-25.
76. Ibid. at para. 32 [emphasis in original]. The majority does not seem to consider, either here
or in para. 43, where the issue is raised again, whether this objective might equally have been
served by ensuring the same right of access as all British subjects to resources in question. The
assumption seems to be that only full treaty protection would suffice.
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This view of the historical context and the objectives of the parties was
coupled with the majority's finding that the record of negotiations
disclosed "more favourable terms" which did not find their way into the
written version of the treaty prepared by the British, which only reflected
the negative restriction on Mi' kmaq trade.77 The combined effect of these
findings was a series of conclusions which are scattered throughout the
decision but which might be summarised as follows. First, although the
negative restriction on trade is all that appears in the written text, a
positive obligation to provide a trading mechanism arises from promises
made in the course of oral negotiations, and from an interpretation of the
objectives of the parties at the time.78 Second, in order for this promise
to have had any meaning, it must be interpreted as including an implied
promise of access to the things which would be traded.79 Third, this right
was limited to trading to obtain "necessaries", which in its modern
version is to be construed as a "moderate livelihood",80 rather than
unrestricted "commercial activity".8 Finally, the modern evolution of
this promise is not the actual provision of truckhouses or equivalent
mechanisms, but rather the continued right to trade and access to the
relevantresources. 2 These conclusions, taken together, were summed up
by the majority in their statement of the treaty right:
77. Ibid. at para. 20:
While the trial judge drew positive implications from the negative trade clause (reversed
on this point by the Court of Appeal), such limited relief is inadequate where the British-
drafted treaty document does not accord with the British-drafted minutes of the
negotiating sessions and more favourabte terms are evident from the other documents
and evidence the trial judge regarded as reliable.
78. Ibid. at paras. 40-41, 54, 56.
79. Ibid. at paras. 42-43.
80. This use of the word "necessaries" and its significance are not well-supported on the facts.
The word only appeared in the record of negotiations with the Maliseet and Passamaquoddy,
a record which may never have been shown to the Mi'kmaq: Marshall #I, supra note 2 at para.
29 of the majority decision. See also para. 97, where McLachlin J., in dissent, quotes the
relevant passage from the Nova Scotia Executive Council Minutes of February 11, 1760.
Furthermore, the term does not appear in any of the key documents actually shared between
the parties: the Treaties, the price list and the Act put forward to implement the Treaties. For
the treaties see Marshall: Prov. Ct., supra note 4 at Appendices V, VI. For a reproduction of
the agreed price list, see B. Murdoch,A History of Nova Scotia orAcadie Vol. II (Halifax: James
Barnes, 1866) at 385. The statute in question was An Act To Prevent Any Private Trade Or
Commerce With The Indians, S.N.S. 1760, 34 Geo.ll, c. 11, which referred onl1y to "any kind
of Provisions, Goods or merchandize whatsoever": see Marshall: Prov. Ct., ibid. at para. 72.
81. Marshall #1, ibid. at para. 59. At some points the majority used the term "sustenance" as
interchangeable with "moderate livelihood", drawing on a discussion of "sustenance" in the
dissent of McLachlin J. (as she then was) in Gladstone: ibid. at para. 60, citing Gladstone, supra
note 31 at para. 165.
82. Marshall #1, ibid. at paras. 53-56.
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My view is that the surviving substance of the treaty is not the literal
promise of a truckhouse, but a treaty right to continue to obtain necessaries
through hunting and fishing by trading the products of those traditional
activities subject to restrictions that can be justified [by the Crown]. 83
The majority went on to deal with the submission of the Crown that, even
if a right to fish and hunt had been conveyed, it was "subject ab initio to
regulations", and therefore the regulations in place did not require any
justification by the Crown under the test set out in Sparrow for aboriginal
rights and applied to treaties in Badger and other cases.84 This argument
was dismissed, as was a similar contention advanced by McLachlin J. in
the dissent, that the Mi'kmaq had obtained "only the liberty to hunt, fish,
gather and trade 'enjoyed by other British subjects in the region' .... "I
The basis of this rejection, which relied on a distinction between the
possibly shared content of the rights and the different levels of constitu-
tional protection which they are accorded,8 6 is discussed in greater detail
in Part IV(2), below.
In the final stage of its consideration, the majority briefly considered
the regulations in question and found that they did constitute aprimafacie
infringement of the appellant's treaty right, largely by reference to
previous cases in which licensing schemes and other such restrictions
have been found to be infringements. 87 In the absence of any arguments
on justification of the regulations, which had not been dealt with at trial,
the majority found that the regulations were "inconsistent with the treaty
rights of the appellant" and "therefore of no force or effect or application
to him, by virtue of ss. 35(1) and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982",
allowed the appeal and ordered an acquittal. 88
5. The Supreme Court of Canada #2
In the motion brought by the intervener West Nova Fishermen's coali-
tion, the Court was requested both to grant a rehearing of the appeal to
allow for clarification of a number of questions relating to the impact of
the first decision, and to stay the effect of the earlier judgment pending
that rehearing.89 The Court's response, in its ruling of 17 November 1999,
can best be understood as two decisions in one. The requests for a
rehearing and stay were both disposed of in fairly short order on narrow
issues. On the request for a rehearing, the Court noted that while the rules
83. Ibid. at para. 56.
84. See the discussion in the text accompanying note 30.
85. Marshall #1, supra note 2 at para. 45.
86. Ibid. at paras. 45-48.
87. Ibid. at paras. 62-66.
88. Ibid. at para. 67, quoting from the constitutional question posed by Lamer C.J.C.
89. Marshall #2, supra note 6 at paras. 1, 9.
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of the Court gave itjurisdiction to consider an intervener's application for
a rehearing, this would only happen in "exceptional circumstances". The
Court found that there were no such exceptional circumstances in this
case, and that the motion also violated "the basis on which interveners are
permitted to participate in an appeal in the first place, which is that
interveners accept the record as defined by the Crown and the defence."9
Although this conclusion made consideration of the stay unnecessary, the
Court also noted that the appellant was "ordinarily entitled to an imme-
diate acquittal", and that the Crown had not applied for a stay of the wider
effects of the decision.9'
The rejection of the intervener's motion on the procedural issues
effectively settled the matter, but the Court then went on to provide a
second "decision within a decision", in what amounts to an extraordinar-
ily long passage of obiter dicta. At the heart of these portions of the ruling
is the Court's repeated contention that the decision of September 17 had
been perfectly clear on all of the issues now raised for clarification by the
Coalition, and that the failure of the Coalition (and others) to understand
the earlier decision did notjustify a rehearing.9 2 Despite these assertions,
the Court went on to simply restate (in its view) some of the fundamental
aspects which had been so clear in the first decision. If, however, we are
to gain a better sense of the actual degree of clarity in Marshall #1, and
the resulting utility of the message provided to subsequent negotiations,
it is necessary to examine some of these "non-clarifications" in more
detail, and to compare them with their counterparts in the earlier decision.
Ill. "We're Sorry, We'll Read That Again": Marshall #1 vs. Marshall #2
Despite the assurances of the Court in Marshall #2, significant areas of
doubt emerge when we compare and contrast the two decisions with
respect to both the essential elements of the right and the extent of
permissible government regulation, two of the central issues on which
parties to negotiations would require guidance. Differences in emphasis
or outright contradictions can be identified with respect to at least four
critical elements: the beneficiaries of the right; the geographic applica-
tion of the right; the resources to which the right applies; and the
90. Ibid. at para. 9; Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, S.O.R./83-74, s. 1.
91. Marshall #2, ibid. at paras. 8, 47.
92. Ibid. at para. 11: "These questions 1posedby the intervener], together with the Coalition's
request for a stay of judgment, reflect a basic misunderstanding of the scope of the Court's
majority reasons for judgment dated September 17, 1999." See also ibid. at para. 25 on the
question of the scope of regulatory power in the hands of the government: "With all due respect
to the Coalition, the government's general regulatory power is clearly affirmed. It is difficult
to believe that further repetition of this fundamental point after a rehearing would add anything
of significance to what is already stated in the September 17, 1999 majority judgment."
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substantive content of the right, which is linked to the question of what
will constitute a primafacie infringement.
1. Beneficiaries of the Right
A fundamental requirement in the formulation and subsequent imple-
mentation of a right, whether under a treaty or otherwise, is the identifi-
cation of those who are entitled to its exercise. Previous treaty cases have
certainly taken care to address the question of who acquires the right,93
for obvious reasons. Unless the claimants of the right can show they are
persons entitled to exercise it, there can be no finding of a prima facie
infringement, and thus no further steps in the interpretation process need
be addressed. This issue is also crucial to post-litigation implementation,
in that subsequent decisions on everything from the establishment of
licence schemes to individual prosecutions will depend on this definition
of the entitlement.
The trial decision, while denying the effect argued by the defence for
the Treaties of 1760 and 1761, did conclude that they were "valid treaties"
which "apply to all Mi'kmaq in Nova Scotia today and were applicable
to the Defendant... at Pomquet Harbour .... " 94 Mr. Marshall, as was
noted in the agreed statement of facts, is "a status Mi'kmaq Indian
registered under the provisions of the Indian Act (Canada) .... -9 No
specific consideration was given to the question of non-status Mi'kmaq,
nor of status Mi'kmaq living off-reserve, although this has been a subject
of debate in the past.96 The Supreme Court did not really address the issue,
93. See e.g., Horseman, supra note 23 at 924: "[The appellant] is a descendant of the Indian
people who were parties to Treaty No. 8"); Badger, supra note 22 at para. 37 ("members of
bands which were parties to Treaty No. 8"); Simon, supra note 13 at 407-08.
94. Marshall: Prov. Ct., supra note 4 at para. 132.
95. Ibid. at para. 4.
96. See e.g., "The Mi'Kmaq and the Fishery", supra note 13 at 139, note 75, on the question
of how to "integrate the various Mi'kmaq constituencies". See also F. Caron, "Challenges of
the Treaty Relationship" (1994) 43 U.N.B.L.J. 256 at 258 on the importance of this issue in the
face of an increasing off-reserve aboriginal population. With respect to the Maliseet and
Passamaquoddy, Marshall does seem to confirm the validity of their treaty of 1760, even
though it is outside the precise scope of the case. However, the Maliseet/Passamaquoddy
version contains a more explicit reference to renewal of the 1725-26 Treaties, which may result
in a different, possibly broader, scope to the definition of the rights: Marshall: Prov. Ct., ibid.
at paras. 68, 107.
The reference to "all Mi'kmaq" might be argued to extend the effect of the decision to at
least off-reserve and possibly non-status individuals, but given the lack of attention to the issue,
this cannot be taken as settled.
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other than to note that the appellant and his fishing companion were "both
Mi'kmaq Indians", 97 and presumably relied on the trial court's finding on
entitlement.
Following the decision, part of the public debate which emerged was
focussed on differences of opinion within the Mi'kmaq community as to
which individuals and groups were actually entitled to exercise the right
affirmed by the Supreme Court.9" The ruling on the rehearing did not
specifically address the question of non-status aboriginal persons or off-
reserve Mi'kmaq, and Mr. Marshall's residence was not clear from the
agreed statement of facts, so the scope of the finding is likely limited to
what the Court had before it-the case of a status Mi'kmaq who was a
member of an identified Band-and the cases of other individuals, if not
brought in to the process through negotiations between the government
and Mi'kmaq authorities, will have to await subsequent litigation.99 This
view is strengthened by how the majority did deal with a related issue in
Marshall #2, when they clarified a point not addressed in the original
decision, and added a description of the right as "collective" in nature, and
tied to communities with connections to particular treaties:
[T]he exercise of the treaty rights will be limited to the area traditionally
used by the local community with which the "separate but similar" treaty
was made. Moreover, the treaty rights do not belong to the individual, but
are exercised by authority of the local community to which the accused
belongs .... 100
97. Marshall #1, supra note 2 at para. 1. The Native Council of Nova Scotia, an organisation
which represents off-reserve aboriginal persons in Nova Scotia, was represented as an
intervener in both Marshall #1 and Marshall #2.
98. The Assembly of First Nations took the view that the rights extended to "every individual
of the tMi'kmaq] Nation, whether they live on or off reserve": See "National Chief Welcomes
Government Offer", supra note 10. This opinion was not universally shared: See e.g., the
position of D. Paul, "Recognition of Aboriginal Rights Poetic Justice" 10/11 Mi'kmaqMaliseet
Nation News (November 1999) 19 at 19.
99. The recent case of Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [ 1999]
2 S:C.R. 203, dealt with the application of equality rights under s. 15 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, to the question of voting by off-
reserve members of bands under the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5 [hereinafter Indian Act].
While s. 15 was found to be infringed, however, the case was narrowly stated: See e.g., para.
25, on the importance attached to such a fundamental aspect of political participation as voting.
The application of Corbiere to issues such as access to resource rights under treaties is both
speculative and beyond the scope of this article.
100. Marshall #2, supra note 6 at para. 17. This point was reiterated elsewhere in the decision.
See also para. 13: "In his defence, the appellant established that the collective treaty right held
by his community allowed him to fish for eels .... Caron, supra note 96 at 258 notes that it
may be possible in future cases to argue on the basis of a"... 'substantial connection' to the
successor of the original treaty group" although he notes that "there is little to direct us on the
question of what factors are determinative in establishing.., substantial connection." In R. v.
Fowler, [1993] 3 C.N.L.R. 173 (N.B. Prov. Ct.) at 180, it was found that a "substantial
connection" of a non-status individual to a community covered by the Treaty of 1725 was
established through being a descendant of members of the relevant First Nation.
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This description of the right as a collective one, exercisable "by
authority of' the community, did not appear in Marshall #1,0' and it
seems likely that this addition was made to deal with a problem identified
in the immediate aftermath of Marshall #1. As negotiations proceeded
between Mi'kmaq authorities and the federal government over interim
management arrangements, there was some question whether any agree-
ments entered into with Mi'kmaq authorities at the band level could
actually be enforced against individuals who fell within the treaty right,
and who disagreed with what the band authorities might concede. 102 This
interpretation would seem to rely on the view that, even if the treaty right
were held collectively (by its very nature), individuals within the group
nonetheless acquired a personal right to exercise it. Removal or limitation
of that individually-held right would thus require a new or amended
treaty, and lesser mechanisms like management arrangements would not
suffice. The new formulation of the right in Marshall #2 was linked to the
Court's suggestion that the ultimate solution is best found through
negotiation. 03 What was missing from the majority decision in Marshall
#1, but provided in Marshall #2, was the identification of a limited
number of parties with whom agreements could be concluded, as opposed
to a large number of independent actors, each with their own interests to
negotiate.
This issue of possible dissenters to agreed measures and the capability
of government (as opposed to aboriginal self-government) to enforce
against them has not been fully dealt with in the treaty rights context. In
Sundown the Court did identify the treaty right as a collective one, and
confirmed that one member of the First Nation holding the right could not
"exclude other members... who have the same treaty right," but did not
101. The majority decision did refer to the rights of the "Mi'kmaq people" and "Mi'kmaq
treaty rights": Marshall #1, supra note 2 at paras. 4, 64. There was, however, no reference to
the "collective" right nor to the exercise of authority over individual beneficiaries, and the final
formulation of the right, referred to the "appellant's treaty right to fish for trading purposes"
and "his fight to trade": ibid. at para. 66.
102. See e.g., the reaction of some members of Burnt Church Reserve to a possible
moratorium, which they were prepared to defy even if agreed by the leadership: "Beyond Burnt
Church", supra note 7 at 34. This issue would not arise if it were a fight to self-government in
relation to fishery resources that was being asserted in Marshall, This was not, however, part
of the claim, although it has been argued that it was an important missing part of the picture:
"Of Eels and Honour", supra note 8 at 2.
103. Marshall #2, supra note 6 at para. 22: "[T]he process of accommodation of the treaty
right may best be resolved by consultation and negotiation of a modern agreement for
participation in specified resources by the Mi'kmaq ......
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need to deal with the additional point of how individuals might be dealt
with should they operate outside terms agreed by the band.' °4 It is
possible that this has been considered to be implicit in the nature of the
right, and that the problem of individual non-compliance with regulations
implementing agreements can be dealt with either by finding that such
regulations accommodate the right and therefore do not prima facie
infringeit,"°5 or because they are justifiable under the Sparrow test. In any
event, the finding in Marshall #2 that the right is both collective and
exercised "by authority" of the collective offers a structure for dealing
with this issue.10 6
2. Geographic Scope
Closely related to the question of who may exercise the right is the
issue of where that right may be exercised, a question that has been
explicitly addressed in previous cases.'07 Given the outcomes at trial and
in the Court of Appeal, where the existence of the claimed right was
rejected, this was not definitively dealt with until the matter came before
the Supreme Court, and its treatment there left significant room for
confusion. First, the majority judgment of 17 September 1999 offered
little or no guidance on the general geographic scope of the right, despite
some obvious questions which would seem to arise, such as the extent of
the colonial boundaries encompassed by the Nova Scotian authorities,
and how expansive a maritime jurisdiction was claimed by the British at
the time. 08
104. Sundown, supra note 28 at para. 36. See also Caron, supra note 96 at 258, where it was
noted that by 1994 it was still "unclear whether the Indian collectivity ... can deny treaty
benefits to individuals... [with a substantial connection] or regulate, in any way, the exercise
of those benefits by the individual."
105. This option is recognized in the ruling on the rehearing, where negotiation of an agreement
is linked to "the process of accommodation": Marshall #2, supra note 6 at para. 22.
106. This issue will continue to present problems, involving as it does "complex questions
of balancing the individual and collective aspects of treaty rights... ": Caron, supra note 96
at 258. These problems will likely be resolved by negotiation, rather than by litigation. If a
government decided to prosecute on the basis of regulations which put in place the terms of an
agreement, it would be up to the individual accused to challenge the regulations.
107. See e.g., the consideration of this issue in Sioui, supra note 17 at 1066, and Badger, supra
note 22 at paras. 49-66.
108. It might be argued that the colonial authorities had no capacity to make treaties
respecting waters beyond the immediate area of coastal jurisdiction claimed at the time. This
would presumably be answered, however, by the response that the rights are not frozen in time,
and must have evolved to encompass new areas of coastal state jurisdiction: Sundown, supra
note 28 at para. 32. Alternatively, it could be argued that the treaty could cover trade and other
rights of individuals fishingfrom Nova Scotia into adjacent waters, especially if priorMi'kmaq
practice indicated that this would have been expected by the parties.
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The more perplexing problem, however, relates to possible geographic
limits on an individual's exercise of the right, assuming an area is within
the ambit of one of the 1760-61 Treaties. In the period following the
Court's September decision, the assumption that seemed to govern the
fishing activities of those Mi' kmaq engaged in the lobster fishery was that
the right could be exercised anywhere within the areas explicitly covered
by the treaties (and possibly beyond).1°9 In the ruling on the rehearing
motion, however, the Court returned to this issue, with the following
description of the treaty rights in question:
The Court's majority judgment noted.., that no treaty was made by the
British with the Mi'kmaq population as a whole.... The treaties were local
and the reciprocal benefits were local. In the absence of a fresh agreement
with the Crown, the exercise of the treaty rights will be limited to the area
traditionally used by the local community with which the "separate but
similar" treaty was made .... I0
This point is further emphasised by the Court's description of the onus
that would fall on an accused in a future case under one of the 1760-61
Treaties once the Crown had proved the factual elements of the offence:
The onus will then switch to the accused to demonstrate that he or she is
a member of an aboriginal community in Canada with which one of the
local treaties ...was made, and was engaged in the exercise of the
community's collective right to hunt or fish in that community's tradi-
tional hunting and fishing grounds.' I
Such a clear statement on the local nature of the rights in the September
decision" 2 would have constituted an important limitation, one which
would necessarily have been a significant element in future decisions on
prosecutions of individuals acting outside their traditional areas, or in
negotiations on the entitlements of particular communities to resources
109. Mi'kmaq fishing in the post-Marshall #1 period included a brief attempt by a few Nova
Scotia Mi'kmaq to enter a snow crab fishery in Newfoundland, which would appear to have
been beyond the conceivable scope even of the combined treaties, which dealt with the old
boundaries of Nova Scotia. Their belongings were burned and they were forced to leave.
Aboriginal leaders, both in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, denounced the violence but
indicated their lack of support for such activities in other areas: 33 Canadian News Facts (1999)
at 5948. Even more ambitiously, a group of Passamaquoddy from Maine announced their
intention of coming to Canada to fish for lobster: "A Fishery on the Boil", supra note 7 at 45.
110. Marshall#2, supra note 6 at para. 17 [emphasis in original].
111. Ibid.
112. This "local" approach is similar to that adopted in Simon, where a connection to the local
community was required. The Court in Simon did not, however, demand that the appellant
prove that he was a "direct descendant of the Micmac Indians covered by the Treaty of 1752"
[emphasis in original], which would involve an "impossible burden of proof'. Rather, it was
sufficient to show that he was a member of the band presently "living in the same area as the
original Micmac Indian tribe, party to the Treaty of 1752": Simon, supra note 13 at 407-08.
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in areas outside their own traditional lands.' 13 The problem is that the
majority judgment in Marshall #1 did not say any such thing. The only
reference to this issue that the Court, in Marshall #2, can point to in the
September decision is a passage which was concerned with the complex-
ity of ascertaining the words of the alleged treaty, and which noted in
passing that "the British signed a series of agreements with individual
Mi'kmaq communities in 1760 and 1761" and that the trial judge "found
that by the end of 1761 all of the Mi'kmaq villages in Nova Scotia had
entered into separate but similar treaties."' 4 There is no mention of the
"local" nature of the right and the "reciprocal benefits", nor of this
element of the burden of proof on a defendant, and the matter is not raised
throughout the rest of the analytical parts of thejudgment. 115 Even by the
standards of the Supreme Court, burying the critical "locality" limitation
in this passing reference seems positively Delphic.
This point is further emphasized by an apparent contradiction between
the two decisions. The ruling on the rehearing clearly stated, as noted
above, that the onus is on the defendant to show that they were "a member
of an aboriginal community in Canada with which one of the local
treaties" was made, and that they were "engaged in the exercise of the
community's collective right to hunt or fish in that community's tradi-
tional hunting or fishing grounds."" 16 In the agreed statement of facts, Mr.
Marshall was described as being a member of the Membertou Band,
whose lands are located near Sydney on Cape Breton Island.' 1 It was
further agreed that the fishing took place "at or near Pomquet Harbour",
and that the holding pens and boats were kept "on lands which are part of
the Afton Indian Reserve",' on the mainland of Nova Scotia in Antigonish
113. This will obviously lead to significant debate about the actual scope of "traditional
lands". In Simon this issue was not fully settled under the 1752 Treaty, in that Dickson C.J. only
said that "at a minimum" the Treaty recognized some hunting rights on the reserve, and that
the appellant was on a road adjacent to the reserve, so that his activities were "incidental" to
even the minimal interpretation of the right: ibid. at 406. The opening now exists after Marshall
to determine where the "maximum" geographic scope of traditional hunting and fishing areas
might be defined. The first case to apply both Marshall #1 and Marshall #2, dealt extensively
with the question of territorial extent of local Mi'kmaq communities, but in the context of a
claim to aboriginal title: Bernard, supra note 16 at paras. 93-110. Bernard also considered the
defence of treaty rights under the 1760-61 Treaties, but it was rejected, at para. 87, on the basis
of the nature of the items traded (logs), so that the territorial aspect was not considered.
114. Marshall #2, supra note 6 at para. 17, quoting from Marshall #1, supra note 2 at para.
5. This limited purpose is clear from what follows the quoted extract, which is a reference to
the trial judge's finding that the "written terms applicable to this dispute were contained in a
Treaty of Peace and Friendship, entered into... on March 10, 1760 .... : Marshall #1, ibid.
115. Nor was it discussed in the trial decision, where, as noted earlier, it was simply found that
the treaties applied to Mi'kmaq in Nova Scotia: Marshall: Prov. Ct., supra note 4 at para. 132.
116. Marshall #2, supra note 6 at para. 17.
117. Marshall: Prov. Ct., supra note 4 at para. 4.
118. Ibid.
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County. Neither the trial record nor the appeal decisions stated which of
the "separate but similar" treaties would have applied to Afton (although
presumably this would have been a necessary step in the process of proof
identified by the Court), but it is unlikely on the historical record that it
would have been the same one as for Membertou. The two nearest
communities of Mi'kmaq identified as having signed a treaty in this
period are Merigomish and Pictou," 19 whose representatives concluded a
treaty in October 176.1220 Cape Breton was covered by a treaty which was
finalized on 25 June 1761.121 On the basis of these facts it would appear,
at least prima facie, that Mr. Marshall was outside his "community's
traditional hunting or fishing grounds", and therefore had demonstrated
no entitlement to a treaty right in that area, if we accept what the Supreme
Court said in the rehearing ruling about their intent in the original
judgment. 122
119. These are the modem place names, but some of the documents refer to e.g., "Malagomish"
or "Malagonich" and "Picktock" or Poctouck". See Whitehead, supra note 13 at 153. See also:
Murdoch, supra note 80 at 407; Union of Nova Scotia Indians & Native Council of Nova
Scotia, The Mi'kmaq Treaty Handbook (Sydney/Truro: Native Communications Society of
Nova Scotia, 1987) at 7 [hereinafter "Treaty Handbook"]. On the locations of Merigomish and
Pomquet, see also W.S. Wallace, ed., The Encyclopedia of Canada Vol. IV (Toronto:
University Associates, 1948) at 274, and Public Archives of Nova Scotia, Place-Names and
Places of Nova Scotia (Halifax: PANS, 1967) at 538.
120. Whitehead quotes a source which refers to one treaty done for Merigomish and Pictou,
on 15 October 1761: T. Akins, History of Halifax City (1973) at 64-66, as cited in Whitehead,
ibid. at 153. Wildsmith also refers to one treaty, but on 12 October 1762: "The Mi'kmaq and
the Fishery", supra note 13 at 117, note 4. The 1761 date is confirmed in Murdoch, ibid. at 407,
and seems consistent with the approximate 18 month period of treaty-making referred to by
Patterson in "Indian-White Relations", supra note 13 at 55. The difference in dates is not
significant to the main point, which is that there were separate treaties for the two areas.
121. "Indian-White Relations", ibid. at 72; "The Mi'kmaq and the Fishery", ibid. It should
be noted that the treaties signed on 25 June 1761 included the "Pokemouche", and one
published list of modem band locations gives the erroneous impression that Afton First Nation
is on the Pokemouche River. The river is actually in New Brunswick, and it is clear from the
same source that the geographical description forBurnt Church was inadvertently repeated for
Afton: L.F.S. Upton, MicmacsAnd Colonists: Indian- White Relations In The Maritimes, 1713-
1867 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1979) at 183, 186.
122. This would be true even on the slightly relaxed standard for proving entitlement
employed in Simon, as discussed supra note 112. The distance between Afton and Membertou,
and the existence of two separate treaties, indicate that Mr. Marshall would not meet this
standard of proof.
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It is, of course, possible that there were other facts'23 or legal argu-
ments 24 that supported Mr. Marshall's assertion of a treaty right in the
Afton area, but if so they do not appear anywhere in the four judgments
in this case. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the onus of
establishing the entitlement to a treaty right applicable to the person and
activity in question does not appear to have been met, at least not to the
standard set by the Court in Marshall #2. In sum, unless there was other
information before the Court to which they do not refer, we are left with
the following conclusion: if what the Court said about this issue in
Marshall #2 is true, then what the majority concluded in Marshall #1
cannot be correct. If they were applying a "local" qualifier to the treaty
right, they had only two options on the basis of the facts as stated. They
could have upheld the conviction, on the basis that the defendant had not
shown any entitlement to a valid treaty right, or they could have sent it
back for trial if they felt the facts were not sufficiently clear on this point.
Affirmation of the treaty right and its application to the benefit of the
defendant would not appear to have been an available alternative. Small
wonder, then, that there was some degree of confusion about the geo-
graphic extent of the right available to individuals in the wake of the
September decision.
3. Resources Included
The conflict precipitated by the September 17 decision centred on the
application of Marshall #1 to other resources, and indeed it seems
obvious that from the perspective of the appellant and the various
supporting aboriginal groups, this case was not taken to the Supreme
123. It is possible, for example, that the traditional hunting and fishing district of the Cape
Breton Mi'kmaq may have extended, if only for some purposes, over the waters in question,
or that Mr. Marshall may have acquired some form of entitlement by residency or family
connection.
124. There are at least three such arguments which might have been possible, but which were
either no longer in issue or do not seem to have been argued. The concept of the Covenant
Chain, supra note 15, could be used to impose the totality of combined treaty obligations across
the Mi'kmaq territory, but this was neither argued nor accepted here. Similarly, the arguments
surrounding the 1752 Treaty mighthave been used, but as noted supra note 58, thatTreaty was
no longer directly before the Court except in a contextual sense. Finally, it has been argued that
Mi'kmaq intermarriage and movement since the 1700s justifies assertion of the treaty rights
by any individual throughout the wider territory: see "The Mi'kmaq and the Fishery" supra
note 13 at 123. This is, however, contrary to the more localized approach taken in Simon, supra
note 13, and in any event the Court makes no mention of any evidence having been offered on
this issue.
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Court simply to establish a right to fish and trade eels.125 The immediate
controversy arose with respect to the lucrative lobster fishery,'12 6 but
broader claims were also made as to the impact of the decision on logging,
minerals and oil and gas.'27 The majority in Marshall #1 defined the
scope of resources and activities covered by the treaty right in different
words at different points, but focussed fairly consistently on the rights to
obtain and trade in the produce of hunting, fishing and "gathering"
activities, as reflected in their modern evolutions:'28
The appellant says the treaty allows him to fish for trade. In my view, the
1760 treaty does affirm the right of the Mi'kmaq people to continue to
provide for their own sustenance by taking the products of their hunting,
fishing and other gathering activities, and trading for what in 1760 was
termed "necessaries".1
29
This definition gives rise to two general issues with respect to its
application to new activities or resources. First, what criteria should be
used to determine those things that fall within the potentially open-ended
notion of "gathering", and, second, what limits, if any, will be placed on
the range of species included in the more self-explanatory categories of
hunting and fishing? With respect to the first question, the majority in
Marshall #1 did refer to the relevant resources and activities as "tradi-
tional", which could be taken to imply that only things traditionally
gathered at the time of the Treaty should be brought within the definition
125. This fact seems to have been recognized by Court in both decisions, although at one point
in ruling on the rehearing, the Court did point out that Marshall #1 was limited to "precise
charges relating to the appellant's participation in the eel fishery" and that it was therefore
"limited to the issues necessary to dispose of the appellant's guilt or innocence": Marshall #2,
supra note 6 at para. I1. While this is, of course, a technically correct view of the ultimate task
of the Court, it ignores the broader impact of the Court's role in defining the right which was
then applied to the appellant's case, and is not really consistent with how the case was
approached in general.
126. This was in part due to the unfortunate timing of the decision, just far enough in advance
of regional season openings to permit the organization of aboriginal fishing in the closed times,
but too close to allow for much in the way of negotiations.
127. Marshall #2, supra note 6 at para. 19.
128. As noted by McLachin J. in her dissent, the restriction to traditional categories of
activities does not "freeze" the exercise of the right in its historical form for all purposes:
"Treaty fights... must not be interpreted in a static or rigid way. They are not frozen at the date
of signature. The interpreting court must update treaty rights to provide for their modern
exercise." Marshall #1, supra note 2 at para. 78, citing Sundown, supra note 28 at para. 32 and
Simon, supra note 13 at 402.
129. Marshall #1, ibid. at para. 4. See also para. 7 ("hunting, fishing and gathering activities
in support of... trade"); para. 66 ("treaty right to fish for trading purposes"); para. 56 ("hunting
and fishing").
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of "gathering" (allowing, of course, for some degree of evolution).' 30 The
relevance of this criterion is a legitimate inference to be drawn from the
majority's use of the term "traditional", but the issue was not addressed
explicitly until the ruling on the rehearing motion, and in the interim some
quite ambitious alternative definitions were put forward.' 3 ' While leav-
ing open the possibility of future arguments on extension to new re-
sources, the Court provided the following interpretation of what they had
meant by "gathering" in the first decision:
The word "gathering" . . . was used in connection with the types of the
resources traditionally "gathered" in an aboriginal economy and which
were thus reasonably in the contemplation of the parties to the 1760-61
treaties. While treaty rights are capable of evolution within limits... their
subject matter (absent a new agreement) cannot be wholly transformed.
The ... majority judgment did not rule that the appellant had established
a treaty fight "to gather" anything and everything physically capable of
being gathered."'
The focus, then, is to be on what was in the "contemplation of the parties
at the time" and that can be determined by what was "traditionally
'gathered' in an aboriginal economy" at the time.'33 This description is
consistent with what was said in Marshall #1, as noted above, but
nowhere is the criterion of prior inclusion in the aboriginal economy so
130. See ibid. at para. 7, where the majority gave the following description of the appellant's
position: "[T]he truckhouse provision . .. incorporated . . . the right to pursue traditional
hunting, fishing and gathering activities .... See also para. 56, for a reference to "a treaty right
to continue to obtain necessaries through hunting and fishing by trading the products of those
traditional activities ......
131 Supra note 127. The situation was probably not ameliorated by the comments of Mr. Nault,
the Minister of Indian Affairs, to the effect that the Marshall decision probably extended to
logging and other resources: J. Gedded "Turmoil In Native Affairs", Maclean's (November 1,
1999) 26 at 26.
132. Marshall #2, ibid. at paras. 19-20. The Court additionally noted, at para. 20, that no
argument had been made in Marshall #1 "that exploitation of such resources could be
considered a logical evolution of treaty rights to fish and wildlife or to the type of things
traditionally 'gathered' by the Mi'kmaq in a 1760 aboriginal lifestyle." It was left open for this
argument to be raised in the future "where the issue is squarely raised on proper historical
evidence ......
133. It is not entirely clear why this should be the governing principle, as it could equally be
argued that the subset of things which were gathered and traded with Europeans might be a
more accurate guide. In the absence of some evidence of difference between the two categories,
however, this point was not open for decision here.
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clearly stated. It is likely that some of the latter debate on this issue might
have been more productive had the point been directly addressed and the
underlying assumptions clarified in Marshall #1, although in fairness to
the Court those assumptions do not actually seem to have changed
between the two rulings.
134
The second question raised above, whether there will be limits on the
actual species covered by treaty-protected fishing and hunting activities,
was not really settled by either of the two decisions. This case was, as the
Court said, about eels,'35 but the clear assumption that ran through both
Marshall #1 and Marshall #2 was that the right certainly applied to
hunting and fishing more generally, without the same definitional prob-
lems that arise with "gathering". 136 However, the linkage of "hunting and
fishing" to the term "traditional"' 37 may make it possible to argue, as for
"gathering," that only the taking of those species traditionally exploited
by the Mi'kmaq at the time should fall within the treaty right. This does
not seem likely to be a major factor on land, where there are no major new
species of interest for hunting, but it could become an issue with respect
to fishing for some offshore species if they were not within the scope of
Mi'kmaq fishing in the 1760s. 38 Given the subject matter of this appeal,
134. This finding from Marshall #2 has already been applied in Bernard, supra note 16 at
paras. 81, 85, 86. Lordon Prov. Ct. J. considered the question of commercial logging and
applied the definition of "gathering" from Marshall #2 (para. 81). He found, at para. 85, that
there "was no traditional trade in logs and that trade in wood products produced by the Mi'kmaq
such as baskets, snowshoes, and canoes was secondary to the fur trade and was occasional and
incidental." In addition, at para. 86, he rejected the idea that a trade in raw commercial logs was
a "logical evolution" from limited trade in items which were processed or made by the
Mi'kmaq, and which bore the "stamp of Mi'kmaq culture."
135. See supra note 125.
136. This is reinforced by the wording in the ruling on the rehearing, which separates the open
question of "gathering" from the apparently settled one of "fish and wildlife":
It is of course open to native communities to assert broader treaty rights... [with respect
to resources], but if so, the basis for such a claim will have to be established in
proceedings where the issue is squarely raised on proper historical evidence, as was
done in this case in relation to fish and wildlife [emphasis added].
Marshall #2, supra note 6 at para. 20.
137. See the discussion supra note 130.
138. The obvious response to this, of course, would be that the rights are not "frozen in time"
and so the "logical evolution" of fishing would be based on "fishing for whatever is available",
just as the Mi'kmaq of the 1760s would have targeted new species as they became available.
On the question of "frozen rights", see the comments of McLachlin J. as quoted supra note 128.
Confirmation of this approach would ameliorate a potential problem with Marshall #2
identified by Barsh & Henderson; the possible wearing down of Mi'kmaq communities
through the government forcing litigation on each and every species and for each and every
community: "Of Eels and Honour", supra note 8 at 17.
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which dealt with a traditionally-fished species, the issue was not defini-
tively settled in Marshall and it can be expected that it will be raised again
in the future.'3 9
4. Substantive Scope of the Right
The definition of the substantive scope of a treaty right involves both its
core elements, such as a right to hunt, fish or trade (including activities
incidental to the primary right), and any agreed limitations on the right
found in the treaty, such as the restriction to a moderate livelihood
incorporated in Marshall #1. A comparison of the two Supreme Court
decisions in Marshall shows some significant differences in how the
treaty right was defined, both with respect to the initial parameters of the
right and the nature of the agreed limitations. In Marshall #1 the treaty
right was defined in fairly straightforward terms to contain both the
underlying right to trade for "necessaries" and the incidental right to
obtain products to trade, so that the modem evolution of the right was "a
treaty fight to continue to obtain necessaries through hunting and fishing
by trading the products of those traditional activities subject to restric-
tions that can be justified under the Badger test."'140
This approach was confirmed in parts of the ruling in Marshall #2,141
but in at least one critical passage the Court offered what appears to be a
fundamentally different characterization of the essential elements of the
right:
[T]he Mi'kmaq treaty right to hunt and trade in game is not now, any more
than it was in 1760, a commercial hunt that must be satisfied before non-
natives have access to the same resources for recreational or commercial
purposes. The emphasis in 1999, as it was in 1760, is on assuring the
Mi'kmaq equitable access to identified resources for the purpose of
earning a moderate living.
42
139. A separate basis for such an argument would be that some offshore areas would be
effectively eliminated by the new restriction to "the area traditionally used by the local
community": Marshall #2, supra note 6 at para. 17. This would of course raise further questions
about the meaning of "used" in this context. For example, would navigation through an area
be a "use" that could then be applied to fishing for a species found there?
140. Marshall #1, supra note 2 at para. 56. In referring to the Badger test, the majority was
presumably referring to the Sparrow test, applied to treaties in Badger. See supra, note 44.
141. See e.g., Marshall #2, supra note 6 at para. 14.
142. Ibid. at para. 38 [first emphasis in original, second emphasis added]. This approach is
generally consistent with the view expressed in Gladstone that a commercial fishery (in that
case under an aboriginal right), did not have the same "internal limitation" as a food fishery and
would not necessarily be given as high a priority in terms of allocation. Both the process and
substance of the allocation, however, would still have to "reflect the prior interest of aboriginal
rights holders": Gladstone, supra note 31 at para. 62.
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This statement shifts the focus from a simple assertion of an entitlement
on the part of the Mi'kmaq to a right based on some equitable share of
certain resources, alongside other users. Apart from reconceptualizing
the Mi'kmaq right on its own, a definition based on "equitable access"
necessarily affects the question of priority of rights and access of other
users. All of this is phrased, not as part of a Sparrowjustification exercise,
but rather as a description of the right itself. If this was indeed the
"emphasis" both in 1760 and 1999, then how clearly did the September
decision develop this characterization of the treaty right as one based on
"equitable access" along with other users? The fact that the words
"equitable access" did not appear in the September decision, let alone in
the paragraphs which defined the treaty right, gives some cause for doubt
about the centrality of this concept to the majority's reasoning. The Court
in Marshall #2 pointed to three specific references in Marshall #1 as
evidence of its clear and consistent stance on the nature of the treaty right,
but even a brief consideration of these justifications casts doubt on
whether this version of the right was intended to be the focus of the first
decision. The first is a passage in which the majority, while demonstrat-
ing that the "traditional ways" of the Mi'kmaq "included hunting and
fishing and trading their catch for necessaries",' 43 included the following,
literally parenthetical, remark about trading with the French and Portu-
guese:
Trading was traditional. The trial judge found ... that the Mi'kmaq had
already been trading with Europeans, including French and Portugese [sic]
fishermen, for about 250 years prior to the making of this treaty."
This passing reference to the previous trading activities was included in
Marshall #1 solely to make the point that the Mi'kmaq had been trading
their products for some time. The majority never subjected this finding of
fact to any analysis which would suggest that it confirmed coexisting
rights of others, or limited those of the Mi'kmaq. Yet, in the ruling on the
143. Marshall #1, supra note 2 at para. 38.
144. Ibid.
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rehearing, this comment was transformed into a clear statement of a
conclusion that was vital to the description of the right:
[T]he September 17, 1999 majority judgment noted the trial judge's
finding that the Mi'kmaq had been fishing to trade with non-natives for
over 200 years prior to the 1760-61 treaties. The 1760-61 treaty rights were
thus from their inception enjoyed alongside the commercial and recre-
ational fishery of non-natives."' 45
This use of the word "thus" can only be described as ambitious in the
context, in that the fact that some non-British fishermen were buying fish
from the Mi'kmaq offers little by way of proof about the rights of British
subjects to catch it. 146 The more fundamental problem, however, remains
the lack of any analysis in Marshall #1 that supports the meaning given
to these words in Marshall #2. Much like the Court's treatment of the
locality issue, one might be inclined to forgive observers who failed to
understand the critical importance of this cryptic reference to the reason-
ing in the September decision.
The second finding pointed out by the Court in support of their prior
clarity on this issue is found in a paragraph in the September decision in
which the majority "recognized that, unlike the scarce fisheries resources
of today, the view in 1760 was that the fisheries were of 'limitless
proportions.""' t47 Again, this does not bear close scrutiny. In the para-
graph in question, Binnie J. was quoting a comment from an earlier
decision, 48 not to support any requirement of equitable sharing, but
rather to make the point that it was not surprising that the right to fish was
not mentioned in a treaty in 1760.14 It is beyond any reasonable
interpretation to suggest that this comment was intended to make the
argument ascribed to it in the later ruling, nor would it be reasonable to
expect a reader to reach that conclusion.
145. Marshall #2, supra note 6 at para. 38 [emphasis added]. Apart from the exaggeration of
the intent of the original statement in Marshall #1, this characterization raises the interesting
question of how, in the absence of startling new historical information on an early European
colonial tourist industry, the presence of French and Portuguese fishing in the 16th,17th and
18th centuries shows that the "recreational" fishery coexisted with the treaty rights "from their
inception" in 1760-61.
146. This right could presumably be found, on the reasoning in Gladstone, in the "common
law right to fish in tidal waters" dating back to the Magna Carta: Gladstone, supra note 31 at
para. 67. Walters has argued that an exclusive aboriginal fishery could be argued for in areas
of Ontario, where the colonial legal history was distinct from British Columbia (the location
in Gladstone): see M.D. Walters, "Aboriginal Rights, Magna Carta and Exclusive Rights to
Fisheries in the Waters of Upper Canada" (1998) 23 Queen's L.J. 301 at 367-68.
147. Marshall #2, supra note 6 at para. 38.
148. Jackv. R.,[1980] 1 SC.R. 294at311.
149. "The right to fish is not mentioned in the March 10, 1760 document... This is not
surprising. As Dickson J. mentioned with reference to the west coast in Jack... in colonial
times the perception of the fishery resource was one of 'limitless proportions'." Marshall #1,
supra note 2 at para. 42.
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The final point raised on this issue concerned a passage in Marshall #1
in which the majority held that treaty rights must be interpreted flexibly
and are not "frozen in time", 5 ° which the Court in Marshall #2 saw as
supporting the argument that the treaty right was now a right to participate
in the "largely regulated commercial fishery of the 1990s."'1' The quoted
paragraph, however, dealt only with the more specific finding that the
appellant could not insist on the provision of truckhouses in the modem
era. 152 The mere fact that the principles of flexibility and evolution of
rights were mentioned in the majority judgment, in the context of an
entirely different issue, is not a substitute for the application of those
principles to the questions of priorities and access in the definition of this
treaty right.
In sum, none of the passages in Marshall #1 referred to by the Court
in Marshall #2 is particularly concerned with the issue of equitable access
or the rights of others to the fishery. It is difficult to avoid the impression
that the ruling on the rehearing represented a retreat from, or at least a
reformulation of the right set out in Marshall #1. 5 3 At the very least, this
examination suggests that the majority was less than clear on the issue in
the first decision.
54
With respect to additional agreed or internal limitations on the right,
there are further differences between Marshall #1 and Marshall #2 which
give rise to some concern. In the former, the only internal limit on the right
that was specifically identified was the restriction to securing a "moderate
livelihood," and it was clearly stated that any activities beyond that would
be "outside treaty protection". 55 The corollary to this position was that
any regulations, such as catch limits, which still allowed for a moderate
livelihood would not result in a primafacie infringement and would thus
150. Ibid. at para. 53, cited at Marshall #2, supra note 6 at para. 38: "It was established in
Simon... that treaty provisions should be interpreted 'in a flexible way that is sensitive to the
evolution of changes in normal' practice, and Sundown... confirms that courts should not use
a 'frozen-in-time' approach to treaty rights."
151. Marshall #2, ibid at para. 38.
152. The court held that the appellant could not "claim to exercise his treaty rights using an
outboard motor while at the same time insist on restoration of the peculiar 18th century
institution known as truckhouses.": Marshall #1, supra note 2 at para. 53.
153. Allowing, of course, for the fact that the original version of the right also appears in
Marshall #2, as was noted earlier, supra note 141. Barsh & Henderson certainly view this
finding as a serious modification of the right, although they concentrate on "equitable access"
as modifying only the "moderate livelihood" aspect, rather than the entire character of the right:
"Of Eels and Honour", supra note 8 at 16.
154. This is particularly evident when one considers the much more extensive treatment
which this issue received in such cases as Sparrow, supra note 28 at 1114-17, and Gladstone,
supra note 31 at paras. 59-64.
155. Marshall #1, supra note 2 at paras. 7-8.
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not require justification. 5 6 In the ruling on the rehearing the Court
adopted a more specific and arguably more extensive approach to the
question of inherent limitations on the treaty right, partly by enumerating
limits which were supposedly "apparent" in Marshall #1,1" 7 but also
through revisiting the question of a "moderate livelihood" and its inter-
action with a finding of prima facie infringement. The result is wording
that varies in tone if not in substance from the first decision, in a way that
may affect what has to be proved by parties in subsequent cases. In
Marshall #1 the majority described the relationship between the "mod-
erate livelihood" limitation and a finding of prima facie infringement as
follows:
Catch limits that could reasonably be expected to produce a moderate
livelihood for individual Mi'kmaq families at present-day standards can
be established by regulation and enforced without violating the treaty
right. In that case, the regulations would accommodate the treaty right.
Such regulations would not constitute an infringement that would have to
be justified under the Badger standard.'58
This wording was repeated and endorsed in Marshall #2, "' but the Court
also went on to provide a further rephrasing on this important issue:
Only those regulatory limits that take the Mi'kmaq catch below the
quantities reasonably expected to produce a moderate livelihood or other
limitations that are not inherent in the limited nature of the treaty right itself
have to be justified according to the Badger test. 160
Although this is not a clear contradiction of what was stated in Marshall
#1, there is nonetheless an important difference in emphasis. In the
formulation of the first decision, the majority said that catch limits that
could be "expected to produce a moderate livelihood" would not violate
the treaty right and would require nojustification. What this might imply
is that only those catch limits that satisfy a particular criterion (i.e.,
allowing for a moderate livelihood) will escape being found to be aprima
156. Ibid. at para. 61.
157. These included the locality issue, the collective aspect of the right, the restriction to
"traditionally gathered" resources and the need for equitable sharing of access: Marshall #2,
supra note 6 at para. 38. Some of these, such as equitable access, are better characterized as
descriptors of the basic elements of the right, rather than additional limitations, but the impact
is the same in that regulations dealing with either could possibly accommodate the treaty right.
These examples have been dealt with above, and it is at least doubtful whether they were as
clearly stated in the majority judgment in Marshall #1 as the Court in Marshall #2 seems to
believe.
158. Marshall #1, supra note 2 at para. 61.
159. Marshall #2, supra note 6 at para. 36. See also the statement at para. 24: "At para. 58 [of
Marshall #1], the limited nature of the right was reiterated:... 'The treaty right is a regulated
right and can be contained by regulation within its proper limits."'
160. Ibid. at para. 39 [emphasis in original].
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facie infringement of the treaty right. One would expect, therefore, that
the catch limits would have to be shown to be capable of producing the
requisite livelihood, or else they would constitute an infringement requir-
ingjustification. The wording in the extract from Marshall #2 is different,
in that it states that only those "regulatory limits" (not catch limits) that
take the available catch below the requisite level, or are otherwise outside
the inherent limitations of the right, will require justification. The
implication here is that unless the claimant can show the regulations have
the sort of effect described, they will not b6 considered to be aprimafacie
infringement. It is arguable that the same interpretation could be drawn
from the relevant passage in Marshall #1, given that the overall onus on
the claimant to prove the prima facie infringement. At the very least,
however, this paragraph in Marshall #2 made the point far more clearly:
it is for the claimant of the right to show that the impugned regulation
actually infringes on this fight as defined, including its inherent limita-
tions.
The importance of these shifts in emphasis in the definition of the right
and its inherent limitations becomes clear when we consider the impact
on the finding of prima facie infringement. If the right is one of equitable
access, then presumably the defendant would have to show that the
impugned regulations somehow interfered with or prevented them from
obtaining their equitable share of the resource. This would be a very
different question from that asked in Marshall #1 with respect to prima
facie infringement, which concentrated entirely on interference with the
"treaty right to fish for trading purposes", and made no mention of
interference which would prevent "equitable access" as part of a regu-
lated fishery 161 Similarly, if (as stated in Marshall #2), there is no prima
facie infringement until the right to earn a moderate livelihood is
impaired, there was no attempt in Marshall #1 to determine whether the
regulations in question actually interfered with the appellant's ability to
earn a livelihood, as opposed to a simple right to engage in the activity.
6 2
161. Marshall #1, supra note 2 at paras. 64-65. Of the particular regulations under which Mr.
Marshall was charged, the clearest infringement would seem to result from the prohibitions on
catching fish without a licence, and selling fish caught without a licence, but even here the
actual impact on the "access" is not considered by the majority, but rather is assumed. The
impact of the third regulation, dealing with closed times for the net used, is dealt with further
below: see infra note 211 and accompanying text.
162. One could argue that different questions are involved when one is considering a right to
"earn a moderate livelihood" as opposed to a food fishery; should the same level of interference
suffice for both? For example, would the payment of a licence fee at a level which did not reduce
the return below a moderate livelihood still be a prima facie infringement? This issue is
discussed further in Part IV(2), below.
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5. Summary
It is clear from the discussion above that there were important differences
between Marshall #1 and Marshall #2 on central elements of the treaty
right in question, ranging from who could exercise it and where, to what
the substantive content and permissible level of regulation might be.
While some of this could be attributed to the Court's backtracking in the
face of controversy, it is significant that on the issues that caused the
greatest difficulty, the original decision was either silent or overly vague.
The decision, then, may have been more in need of clarification than the
Court was willing to admit in Marshall #2 (though this is not to say that
they had to clarify in the relatively restrictive manner that they did). It is
at least possible that this apparent confusion on the part of the Court itself
was shared by those attempting to work out the implications of the first
decision.
IV. From Interpretation to Implementation:
Some Sources of Difficulty in Marshall
The Marshall case, as noted earlier, did not present any new challenges
for the interpretation of treaty rights, and no new principles were
introduced; it was largely a matter of application of existing principles to
the particulars of this case. If it is accepted, as argued above, that there
were important gaps in the first decision, and significant changes in the
second, with respect to key elements of the treaty right and its legitimate
regulation, what was it that led to these difficulties? At least three relevant
problem areas are identifiable in Marshall #1: the lack of precise and clear
delineation of the parameters of the right, confusion as to the extent and
nature of legitimate regulation of the right, and a cursory consideration of
the issue of prima facie infringement.
1. Precision and Clarity: The Parameters of the Right
It was suggested above that an understanding of the role of the Supreme
Court in aboriginal and treaty right cases must encompass the important
requirement of providing guidance, not just to lower courts and legisla-
tures, but to the parties who must negotiate and implement the practical
realities of the rights which have been affirmed by the Court.163 When the
issues concern access to natural resources, the right should be defined so
as to be reasonably clear on issues of importance to the creation of a
163. The question of the clarity of the Court's intentions has certainly been raised with respect
to previous cases, as in the following comment on Sparrow: "The Sparrow decision is in the
grand tradition of Supreme Court of Canada cases that have raised ambiguity about the content
of Aboriginal rights to a high art form.": "The Sparrow Decision", supra note I at 221.
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management regime. As indicated in the preceding section, however, a
consideration of the two decisions in Marshall indicates that the Court
fell well short of the mark in the search for clarity on essential issues
which would obviously require negotiation. It would be difficult if not
impossible to create an agreed management system without some notion
of its geographic extent and the priority of allocations, to name just two
issues.
There is, however, a serious difficulty which confronts the Court in its
attempts to provide sufficient structure on these issues, one which is at the
heart of its repeated calls for negotiated settlements."6 While it may be
desirable to settle as much as possible in the context of the case before it,
the Court is limited by the nature of the appellate process, and particularly
by the facts. A broad settlement of all of the issues which arise from the
Treaties of 1760-61 would not be possible within the confines of the case
presented without wandering into unacceptable speculative debate about
matters not before the Court. 16 5 For example, without full consideration
of the different facts that would be relevant, the exact contours of the
rights held by the Maliseet and Passamaquoddy could not be settled in a
case dealing with the Mi'kmaq. Nor, as the Court itself points out in
Marshall #2, could it lay out an exhaustive list of all the resources that
would or would not be covered by the treaty right in a future case. 166
How, then, is the Court to fulfil its role of providing the parties with
usable parameters for negotiation while respecting its limited mandate in
an adversarial system? The negative aspects of the experience in Marshall
indicate that there are at least two issues which the Court would do well
to keep in mind. The first is the necessity of approaching the definition of
rights in a systematic manner, based on the steps of the interpretive
process set out in previous cases (as discussed in Part I, above). In
Marshall #1 the majority at times simply passed over issues (such as the
entitlement of the individual and the actual parties to the treaties) which
had in other cases been routinely addressed and dealt with, and was at
least vague on others (such as the nature of the primafacie infringement).
A more methodical approach to the initial definition of the right, and
ultimately to the question of its infringement, might have led the majority
to fill in the more obvious gaps. This issue was raised, in the context of
164. See the discussion in the text accompanying notes 48 to 50.
165. As noted in the comments of the Court in Marshall #2, supra note 6 at paras. 11, 19, 20,
31.
166. Ibid. at para. 20.
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justification and regulatory options, in the dissent, where it was argued
that sensible consideration of these issues required a precise definition of
the "core" of the right:
To proceed from a fight undefined in scope or modem counterpart to the
question of justification would be to render treaty rights inchoate and the
justification of limitations impossible. How can one meaningfully discuss
accommodation or justification of a right unless one has some idea of the
core of that right and its modem scope? How is the government, in the
absence of such definition, to know how far it mayjustifiably trench on the
fight in the collective interest of Canadians? 1 7
The second issue referred to above involves the need to set out with
greater precision the criteria used to make a particular finding, so that
parties can approach other factual issues with some ability to predict how
they might be treated were the matter to be litigated. With reference to the
question of resources covered by the treaty right, the examination above
suggests that it should at least have been possible for the Court to say why
eels were included, rather than jump immediately to what may have been
an obvious conclusion for that resource, but not for others. An under-
standing of the criteria applied to determine the status of eels could then
be applied by negotiators to other resources. The same is true of the
question of beneficiaries of the right; in Marshall#1 it seems to have been
assumed that Mr. Marshall was entitled to treaty protection by virtue of
being a status Mi'kmaq (possibly living on reserve), but nowhere did the
Court actually indicate whether this would be required of future claim-
ants. Similarly, some reference in the first decision to the notion of
"traditional lands" as a geographic limitation would certainly not have
disposed of the factual debate over the extent of such lands accruing to
each community, but it would at least have set up a basis for discussions
that was not provided until the Court returned to this issue in Marshall #2.
The approach suggested here does not require anything new of the
Supreme Court, for it has in the past used its findings on fairly specific
facts to set out criteria that might be sensibly applied to other situations
falling under the same treaty or a similar aboriginal right. 68 In Marshall
#1 the majority seems to have lost track of this important element of its
role in such cases, and returning to it after the events of the fall of 1999
only engendered suspicion and distrust about the Court's motivation in
167. Marshall #1, supra note 2 at para. 112.
168. There are numerous examples of this type of fairly detailed treatment of such issues. See
e.g., Simon, supra note 13 at 407-08 on the issue of identity of claimants; Badger, supra note
22 at paras. 49-66 on geographical extent; Sioui, supra note 17 at 1066-72 on geography and
1031-32 on identity; Sparrow, supra note 28 at 1116 and Gladstone, supra note 31 at paras.
57-64 on the issue of priority and allocation.
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taking away that which they certainly seemed to have given. There is, of
course, no guarantee that even a completely clear exposition of the
criteria behind the Court's conclusions will obviate the need for further
litigation, given the complexity of the issues and the likelihood of
fundamentally opposed views in some cases, but it should at least
improve the odds. 69
2. "Subject To Regulation": The Nature of the "Hedge"
A recurring theme in both Marshall #1 and Marshall #2 is the continuing
capability of government to regulate the activities of those who are
exercising the defined treaty right,' 70 although (as discussed above) there
are some differences in emphasis between Marshall #1 and Marshall #2
on this point. Apart from the confusion generated on the particulars of the
judgments, however, the Court seems to have had some more general
difficulties with the application of the tests and principles related to the
whole question of legitimate regulation.
Earlier cases have set out a fairly clear distinction between the two
stages at which government regulation of aboriginal or treaty rights might
be found to be acceptable: either the regulation may not constitute aprima
facie infringement if the claimant cannot show a sufficient level of
interference, or the regulation may bejustifiable under the test developed
for aboriginal rights in Sparrow and later applied to treaty rights in
Badger.17 1 The onus for proving a prima facie infringement, as noted
earlier, is on the party claiming the right, while the onus for justification
shifts to the Crown. The distinction between these two circumstances is
clear, but the Court in the Marshall decisions seems to have had some
difficulty in maintaining it.
The Crown argued on the appeal that the treaty fishing rights, if any,
were "subject ab initio to regulations", with the result that "no Badger
justification would be required."' 72 The essence of this argument is that
regulations could not be said to infringe upon a treaty right if it was agreed
by the parties that it could be regulated in that way. 173 A closely related
point was raised by McLachlin J. in the dissent, where she stated that the
Mi'kmaq "acquired all rights enjoyed by other British subjects" and that
169. See "Of Eels and Honour", supra note 8 at 1, 17 for a pessimistic assessment of the likely
outcome in Atlantic Canada; see also Lawrence & Macklem, supra note 41 at 279, on the
desirability of reducing litigation, despite the impossibility of eliminating it.
170. See e.g., the comments of the Court in Marshall #2, supra note 6 at paras. 15, 21, 24-
25, 33.
171. See the discussion in Part I "Sui Generis Treaties; Sui Generis Decisions," above.
172. Marshall #1, supra note 2 at para. 55.
173. For the full argument, see Marshall #1, supra note 2 (Respondent's Factum at paras.
105-32) [hereinafter Respondent's Factum].
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their trading interest "continued to be protected by the general laws of the
province."' 74 This finding essentially completed the argument of the
Crown, in that the position taken by the Crown was that the right was
subject to regulation ab initio, not just in some respects, but to the same
extent as would apply for all other British subjects." 5 Both of these
arguments were rejected by Binnie J. in two significant passages in the
majority judgment. These conclusions, however, raise problems of
inconsistency both with respect to what the Court has found in previous
cases, and with other aspects of its own decisions in Marshall.
The Crown's argument on "ab initio" vulnerability to regulation
received very short shrift from the majority in Marshall #1:
The Crown's attempt to distinguish Badger is not persuasive. Badger dealt
with treaty rights which were specifically expressed in the treaty.., to be
"subject to such regulations as may from time to time be made by the
Government of the country". Yet the Court concluded that a Sparrow-type
justification was required. 6
This use of Badger is consistent with an interpretation of that case
advanced in Sundown,'77 but Badger is not as clear an authority on this
point as is made out here. To begin with, the breadth of the majority's use
of this case is premised partly on a misstatement of important facts from
Badger. It is true that the written treaty in Badger contained the very
general regulatory provision cited above, but this version was explicitly
rejected by the majority in Badger, given the importance of oral promises
174. Marshall #1, supra note 2 at para. 103.
175. Respondent's Factumn, supra note 173 at para. 108.
176. Marshall #/, supra note 2 at para. 55. Badger involved provincial hunting regulations
which conflicted with treaty rights under Treaty No. 8. The impact of the case is somewhat
confused by the operation of the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement, 1930 (Constitution
Act, 1930, Schedule 2) at para. 12 [hereinafter NRTA], which in this case operated to
"constitutionalize" provincial regulations respecting game (within defined limits) which
would otherwise be invalidated by virtue of their conflict with federal jurisdiction through s.
88 of the Indian Act; Badger, supra note 22 at para. 70.
177. Sundown, supra note 28 at para. 38, referring to Badger:
Badger held that both Treaty No. 8 and the NRTA specifically provided that hunting
rights would be subject to regulation pertaining to conservation. It was put in these
words at para. 70:
[Bly the terms of both the Treaty and the NRTA, provincial game laws would be
applicable to Indians so long as they were aimed at conserving the supply of game.
... Thus, provincial laws that pertain to conservation could properly restrict treaty
rights to hunt provided they could be justified under Sparrow.
This interpretation, however, ignores the fact that the passage cited does not say anything about
justification, and (as argued below), Badgerclearly provides for permissible regulation where
agreed under the treaty.
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made separately by agents of the Crown. 78 The result was a treaty right
to hunt and fish which could be limited by government regulation, not
generally as implied in the passage above, but only for conservation
purposes.179 Badger, then, concerned a treaty right that was explicitly
subject to government regulation, but only for specific purposes of
conservation. In the passage quoted above, Binnie J. suggested that
Badger required a Sparrow-type justification even where the treaty
provided an explicit and complete regulatory escape clause, and that this
in itself dispensed with the argument about ab initio powers to regulate.
The fact that Badger actually contained a more limited permission for
government action casts some doubt on this broad assertion.
Further to this, however, we need to consider why and how the
impugned regulations in Badger were found to constitute a primafacie
infringement and thus to require justification. 80 Cory J. only required a
Sparrow justification of the conservation regulations after conducting an
analysis of whether those regulations constituted aprimafacie infringe-
ment of the treaty right,'8' and in the course of that consideration it was
made clear that conservation regulations could have been enacted by the
provincial government without resulting in such an infringement.'8
2
When the decision is considered in its entirety it is clear that the prima
facie infringement in Badger was found because the regulations in
question went beyond what was needed to pursue legitimate regulation
for conservation purposes, largely as a result of the "manner in which the
178. Badger, supra note 22 at paras. 39-40. The Appellant attributed the limitation to
conservation issues solely to the prior awareness of the existence of such legislation already
in place, referring to a comment by Cory I. on the earlier case of Horseman, supra note 23:
Appellant's Factum, supra note 61 at para. 20. It seems clear, however, that the regulatory
power was put in place by the Treaty (as modified by the NRTA) and was restricted to
conservation because of the oral promise and similar limiting language in the NRTA: Badger,
ibid. paras. 39-40, 69.
179. Badger, ibid. at para. 40: "The Treaty... imposed two limitations on the right to hunt.
First, there was a geographic limitation.... Second, the fight could be limited by government
regulations passed for conservation purposes."
180. One puzzling aspect of the finding in Badger is that the safety regulations in question
were found not to be a prima facie infringement of the treaty right, based partly on a finding
that the regulations made "eminently good sense" and were "reasonable regulations aimed at
ensuring safety": Ibid. at paras. 88, 89. This language is similar to the tests applied at the
justification stage, rather than in dealing with infringement. However, the regulations could
probably have been dealt with at the infringement stage in any event, on the basis that they did
not significantly interfere with the exercise of the fight.
181. Ibid. at paras. 72, 86-94.
182. Ibid. at para. 70, dealing with permissible regulation as opposed to consideration of
justification: "[B]y the terms of both the Treaty and the NRTA, provincial game laws would be
applicable to Indians so long as they were aimed at conserving the supply of game. However,
the provincial government's regulatory authority under the Treaty and the NRTA did not extend
beyond the realm of conservation."
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licensing scheme was set up,"' 3 and in particular the presence of a whole
range of restrictions which made it virtually impossible to exercise the
right. These restrictions included, as well as "conservation" restrictions
related to hunting areas and kinds of game, a complete lack of any
provision for "hunting for food" licences, and a requirement that aborigi-
nal hunters would have no "preferential access" to the limited number of
general licences.
In the absence of any real access to appropriate licences, the limits on
the treaty right in Badgerresulted, not from the need to conserve, but from
applying the conservation requirements to all without any priority to
holders of treaty rights.' 84 At the heart of this finding was a requirement
of reasonableness which the majority imposed on the government's use
of its power to regulate for conservation. A finding of prima facie
infringement resulted only when the government actions were "clearly
unreasonable", which is well beyond the standard that the Court would
have applied had it been considering justification:
[T]he provincial government may make regulations for conservation
purposes, which affect the Treaty rights to hunt. Accordingly, Provincial
regulations pertaining to conservation will be valid so long as they are not
clearly unreasonable in their application to aboriginal people. 8
In sum, then, Badger did contemplate cases in which a power to
regulate the treaty right existed ab initio, and where regulations within the
specified category could therefore be found not to constitute aprimafacie
infringement, and that such cases would not be subject to a Sparrow
justification. In other words, the Crown was not attempting to distinguish
Badger, as in Binnie J.'s view, but rather to apply it, as was made clear
183. Ibid. at para. 86.
184. Ibid. at paras. 92-94. In addition, only sport and commercial licences were actually being
issued, and the regulations potentially allowing subsistence hunting were extremely restrictive.
185. Ibid. at para. 90; see text accompanying notes 38 to 41 on the standard in Sparrow.
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by the Respondent.'86 There is some wording in Badger which might, if
taken out of context, support the notion that all provincial regulations
would have required justification, even if they were squarely within the
conservation category, but the overall approach taken in the decision does
not support this view. 87
Binnie J. gave a more extensive response to McLachlin J.' s suggestion
that the rights held by the Mi'kmaq were the same as those enjoyed by
other British subjects. He accepted, for the sake of the argument, that "in
terms of the content of the hunting, fishing and gathering activities, this
may be true,"'88 but went on to find as follows:
There is of course a distinction to be made between a liberty enjoyed by all
citizens and a right conferred by a specific legal authority, such as a treaty,
to participate in the same activity. Even if this distinction is ignored, it is
still true that a general right enjoyed by all citizens can nevertheless be
made the subject of an enforceable treaty promise."8'
186. Respondent's Factum, supra note 173 at para. 122. The early use of this approach was
confirmed in Horseman, just prior to Sparrow, where Cory J. for the majority found that the
inclusion of government regulatory power within a treaty (apart from the NRTA s.88 issue)
could result in appropriate regulations being upheld: "[I]t must be remembered that Treaty No.
8 itself did not grant an unfettered right to hunt. That right was to be exercised 'subject to such
regulations as may from time to time be made by the Government of the country."': Horseman,
supra note 23 at 934-35.
Barsh & Henderson argue that the finding in Badger that "treaty rights are 'always'
subject to regulation ... does not apply ipso facto to hunting fishing and trade under the
Mikmaw treaties in Atlantic Canada", where the NRTA does not apply, and additionally that
the fishery regulations were, unlike the NRTA, not constitutional in character: "Of Eels and
Honour", supra note 8 at 16. This argument misconstrues the impact of the NRTA in Badger,
which was simply to "place the Provincial government in exactly the same position which the
Federal Crown formerly occupied.": Badger, ibid. at para. 96. The finding on the provincial
regulations in Badger, therefore, applies equally to the federal regulations in Marshall, which
are "in exactly the same position" for the purpose of treaty interpretation on issues such as
primafacie infringement and justification. For a discussion of this point, see K. Wilkins, "Of
Provinces and Section 35 Rights" (1999) 22 Dal. L.J. 185 at 215-16.
187. Badger, ibid. at para. 90, where the majority referred back to earlier cases and noted that
the court "has held on numerous occasions that there can be no limitation on the method, timing
and extent of Indian hunting under a Treaty." It is clear from the following paragraphs,
however, that the phrase "under a Treaty" includes the right as fully defined, including
permissible areas of regulation. As noted supra note 177, the interpretation put forward in
Sundown does support the majority's view in Marshall #1.
188. Marshall #1, supra note 2 at para. 45 [emphasis in original].
189. Ibid. at para. 45.
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The logic of this argument is not, however, entirely convincing. If the
treaty right is defined in such a way that it has inherent limits (as was
explicitly the case in Badger), then those limits are an important part of
the content of the right that should be protected. If the right is "protected"
without reference to its limiting as well as its permissive aspect, then its
content is being altered and expanded in the process of protection. Thus,
if it is accepted for the sake of argument that the treaty right in Marshall
was one which was properly defined as "a right to enjoy the same fishing,
hunting, and gathering rights as other British subjects" and the rights of
other British subjects were so defined that they were subject to regulation,
then only that limited right would be subject to treaty protection.' 90 On
this point, Binnie J. turns to Lieutenant Governor Belcher's statement to
Mi'kmaq representatives assembled for a treaty signing that "[t]he Laws
will be like a great Hedge around your rights and properties" and
analogizes as follows:
Until enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982, the treaty rights of aborigi-
nal peoples could be overridden by competent legislation as easily as could
the rights and liberties of other inhabitants. The hedge offered no special
protection.... On April 17, 1982, however, this particular type of "hedge"
was converted by s. 35(1) into sterner stuff that could only be broken down
when justified according to the test laid down in R. v. Sparrow .... 1
The argument raised by both the Crown and McLachlin J. did not,
however, question the strength of the hedge, but rather what is found
inside it-the content of the right. The majority held that "[t]he issue here
is not so much the content of the rights or liberties as the level of legal
protection thrown around them",'92 but this is a false dichotomy, for it is
only the content of the right that tells us what is inside the hedge and thus
protected.
It is possible that the Court is moving to adopt the interpretation of
Badger first advanced in Sundown, which would require justification
even of regulatory actions agreed in the treaty. 93 This would, however,
190. Binnie J. referred to this argument as placing the Mi'kmaq in the position of "'citizens
minus' with no greater liberties but with greater restrictions": ibid. However, the logic of this
argument is dependent on a view that the Mi' kmaq would thus be giving things away but getting
nothing. It ignores the fact that, as Binnie J. notes at para. 54, the "truckhouse system offered
very considerable financial benefits to the Mi'krnaq", so that they could equally be described
as citizens "with no greater liberties" but who traded one (financial) benefit for another (trade)
restriction.
191. Marshall #1, supra note 2 at para 48.
192. Ibid. at para. 47.
193. Supra note 177. This was certainly the position advanced by the Appellant at the
Supreme Court: "This Honourable Court [in Badger] thus required that laws expressly
authorized by a treaty must nevertheless meet the Sparrow test of justification": Appellant's
Factum, supra note 61 at para. 72 [emphasis in original]. As is argued here, this position
overstates the actual effect of Badger, and ignores language to the contrary in that case.
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involve a blurring of the distinct concepts of prima facie infringement and
justification, and fail to acknowledge the possibility that treaties, unlike
aboriginal rights that existed independently of any agreement, could
include agreed'94 provisions that certain types of regulation would be
permissible, and therefore not a breach of the treaty.'95 This would not,
moreover, explain the most puzzling aspect of the majority' s reaction to
this argument, which is its own endorsement of the concept of ab initio
vulnerability to regulation elsewhere in the decision. It is clear from
Marshall #1 that regulations which allow for the securing of a moderate
livelihood will not constitute a prima facie infringement of the treaty
right, 196 yet this is nothing more than the recognition of a regulatory
power incorporated in the right from the beginning by agreement of the
parties, which is precisely what the Crown was arguing for, albeit on a
much more expansive basis.
Alternatively, it is possible that the majority simply misapprehended
the nature of the argument made by the Crown on this point, assuming that
what was being suggested was that the right was subject to regulation ab
initio whether or not agreement to that effect could be found in the treaty.
This would assimilate the Crown's argument to one already raised and
rejected in earlier cases, that the mere presence of government regula-
tions prior to 1982 would be enough to extinguish aboriginal or treaty
194. The significance of this difference between aboriginal and treaty rights is highlighted in
the Respondent's argument: Respondent's Factum, supra note 173 at para. 129. On the
distinctions between aboriginal and treaty rights in this respect, see "Defining Parameters",
supra note 17 at 158:
The rights guaranteed to Aboriginal peoples in treaties with the Crown are the result of
consensual negotiations .... Each side obtained valuable consideration from the other,
but only after giving up something equally desired.... As negotiated rights, treaty rights
may be comprised of any rights agreed to by the parties involved.
195. More narrowly, it is possible that the Court will allow this argument only where
regulations of a similar type were already in place at the time of the treaty could such actions
escape ajustification exercise, an issue which was mentioned in passing in Badger, supra note
22 at para. 70, referring to the finding in Horseman, supra note 23 at 935. See supra note 178
on the use of this argument by the Appellant, and the contrary impression given by other
passages in Badger. This argument would not, moreover, explain the moderate livelihood
category, as no such contemporaneous regulations were referred to by the majority.
196. For a discussion, see the text accompanying note 156.
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rights. 197 In Sparrow, the Supreme Court found that the Crown, in arguing
that regulatory action could extinguish aboriginal rights, had confused
"regulation with extinguishment". 98 Here, however, the Court appears
to be confusing regulation pursuant to an agreement with extinguish-
ment. In this case the Crown's argument was not about unilateral
extinguishment by regulation, but about a treaty-based agreement to
allow regulation, and thus would not even rely upon the existence of such
regulations prior to 1982 (as did the Crown's case in Sparrow).19 9
Whether premised on a new approach to agreed powers to regulate, or
on a narrow misreading of one argument in this case, there are certainly
indications of confusion and a blurring of boundaries in the Court's
treatment of permissible regulation. In some instances this is simply a
matter of stating that the right is "subject to regulation" without specify-
ing whether this was intended to cover either or both of the available
means for legitimizing a regulation. 00 In some passages, however, the
Court seemed to "mix and match" the tests without really being aware of
the significance of moving back and forth between the two.20' This
occasional tendency in Marshall (which is counterbalanced by correct
197. This interpretation of the majority's response to this argument is supported by their final
comment that the protection offered to Mi'kmaq treaty rights, even if they were the same as
those of other inhabitants, would not be detracted from "unless those rights were extinguished
prior to April 17, 1982": Marshall #1, supra note 2 at para. 48. See also Marshall #2, supra note
6 at para. 6, where the only two identified categories of acceptable regulation are those which
reached the level of extinguishment, and those which arejustifiable. On the test for extinguisment
see Sparrow, supra note 28 at 1099, where it was made clear that simple regulation without
"clear and plain" intention to extinguish was insufficient. For treaties, given their consensual
nature, consent of the aboriginal parties would also be required: Sioui, supra note 17 at 1063.
198. Sparrow, ibid. at 1097.
199. The Respondent was quite clear in restricting the argument to cases where the parties
could be said to have agreed to the regulatory power; see Respondent's Factum, supra note 173
at para. 129: "An infringement of a treaty only arises if the regulatory control imposes a
restriction or limitation which goes beyond the scope of those controls to which the parties
could reasonably be said to have agreed." It may be that the majority could accept this for a
narrow, well-defined set of permissible regulations, but a virtually complete range of "agreed"
regulatory powers looked too much like the complete removal of the right. This is not, however,
a point of principle, but rather a determination to be made on the facts of a case.
200. See e.g., Marshall #1, supra note 2 at paras. 4, 38.
201. For example, a statement that the Crown had not put forward evidence of "justification"
is accompanied by an example ofjustificatory evidence that might have been led. The example,
however, is from R. v. Nikal, 11996] 1 S.C.R. 1013 thereinafter Nikal] at paras. 91-92, and it
deals with evidence from an analysis of prima facie infringement: Marshall #2, supra note 6
at para. 27. See also "Of Eels and Honour", supra note 8 at 4, note 31, where it is stated that
"infringement was not before the Supreme Court" as the Crown argued there was no treaty right
and "accordingly made no attempt to justify" the regulations. The point of the Crown's
alternative argument, as discussed above, is that ifthere was a right, it was subject to regulation
and thus there was no infringement.
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treatments elsewhere) does not necessarily raise problems of principle, in
that it is easily dealt with by a more systematic application' of the
sequential steps already established in the earlier cases, but it certainly
increased the possibility of doubt and confusion in the aftermath of the
decisions.
None of this, of course, in any way answers the question of whether the
regulatory power argued for by the Crown in Marshall could have been
found within the treaties of 1760-61. The proposed scope is extremely
broad, and it is not supported by the sort of explicit language that was
present in Badger. The essence of the argument is founded on the general
submission of the Mi'kmaq to British laws,202 and it would be entirely
open to a court to find that this is simply too little, in the face of treaty
interpretation rules requiring resolution of ambiguity in favour of ab-
original parties, to open up the regulatory door quite this wide. This
would, however, be a question to be determined on the facts of the treaty
before the court, rather than by merging the interpretation stages of prima
facie infringement and justification. 203
202. Respondent's Factum, supra note 173 at paras. 115-18.
203. Some of the confusion on primafacie infringement and justification in Marshall might
be attributed to a sense on the part of the Court that, onus notwithstanding, the distinction is
not a terribly important one for practical purposes. What matters is that the Court is "most
comfortable when it is in a position to 'balance rights': "The Sparrow Doctrine", supra note
I at 225. A finding of no prima facie infringement is a conclusive one; the Court loses any
opportunity to carry out what it might see as appropriate balancing.
The problem with this reasoning in the Atlantic region lies in s. 88 of the Indian Act and
future challenges to provincial legislation. The NRTA does not apply in this region, so that,
unlike Badger, an infringement of a treaty right by provincial legislation leads to conflict with
the federal legislation. As in Simon, supra note 13 at 414-15, this leads to the inapplicability
of the provincial legislation due to the conflict with s. 88, and without any need for reference
to s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. The problem, from a provincial perspective, is that
there is no obvious reason for the justificatory arguments available under s. 35(1) to be applied
to a simple matter of federal vs. provincial powers under s. 88. The result of a finding of
infringement, then, could be complete inapplicability with no option to justify. This issue was
addressed in Cot, although it did not need to be settled as s. 88 was found not to be engaged.
However, Lamer, C.J.C. did state the following:
[I] note that, on the face of s. 88, treaty rights appear to enjoy a broader protection from
contrary provincial law under the Indian Act than under the Constitution Act, 1982.
Once it has been demonstrated that a provincial law infringes "the terms of a treaty",
the treaty would arguably prevail under s. 88 even in the presence of a well-grounded
justification. The statutory provision does not expressly incorporate a justification
requirement analogous to the justification stage included in the Sparrow framework.
But the precise boundaries of the protection of s. 88 remains a topic for future
consideration.
Cotn, supra note 35 at para. 87. It is difficult to see a principled basis for incorporating the
justification stage in such a case, but this is in any event beyond the scope of this paper. See
also the passing reference to provincial infringement (subject to justification) of aboriginal
rights under s. 35(1) in Delgamuukw, supra note 46, as discussed in Wilkins, supra note 186
at 206-19. This is a distinct issue from a s. 88 claim proceeding without reference to s. 35(1).
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3. Finding Prima Facie Infringement
Apart from the problem of clearly distinguishing between infringement
and justification, the majority's actual determination of the primafacie
infringement in Marshall #1 gives some cause for concern. Binnie J.
noted that the regulations in question placed "the issuance of licences
within the absolute discretion of the Minister", and that there was
"nothing in these regulations which gives direction to the Minister to
explain how she or he should exercise this discretionary authority in a
manner which would respect the appellant's treaty rights.""° He then
referred to the applicable test for finding a primafacie infringement, as
derived from Sparrow, which requires an inquiry into the unreasonable-
ness of the intrusion, the hardship caused and the possible denial of
"preferred means" of exercising a right. 05 While the test is clear, what is
missing is the actual application of the test to the facts as found in this
case. The majority refers to previous decisions in which licensing
schemes with the characteristics noted above were considered0 6 and
seems to assume that a similar licensing scheme in this case will also
amount to an infringement. No mention is made of the fact that all of the
previous cases involved aboriginal or treaty rights to fish or hunt for food
(or ceremonial purposes) only, and not for trade.20 7
What the majority has done in this portion of the judgment is to
consider whether the regulations (e.g., licensing schemes) are infringe-
ments in isolation from the right, as indicated by their description of the
decision in Adams as having "applied [the Sparrow] test to licensing
schemes", and found an infringement. 208 The test is not to be applied to
the "scheme", but to the impact of a scheme on a treaty right; an
infringement results, not from the mere presence of a type of regulation,
but from the interaction of that regulation with a particular right. This
view is confirmed by a consideration of the analyses conducted in the
cases cited by the majority, in which licensing provisions were found to
be infringements (or not) only by virtue of the degree of interference they
represented to the particular right in question. 209 In Nikal the majority
204. Marshall #1, supra note 2 at para. 64.
205. As quoted in the text accompanying note 36.
206. Marshall #1, supra note 2 at para. 64. The cases referred to are: Badger, supra note 22;
Cord, supra note 35; Nikal, supra note 201; R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101 [hereinafter
Adams].
207. Badger, ibid. atpara. 37; Nikal, ibid. at 88-89;Adams, ibid. at para. 45; Cotd, ibid. at para.
57.
208. Marshall #1, supra note 2 at para. 64.
209. See e.g., Badger, supra note 22 at paras. 88-95; Adams, supra note 206 at paras. 50-55.
In Cote, supra note 35 at paras. 77-80, it was held that a fee for entering a controlled zone in
a vehicle was not a sufficient interference with a right to fish for food.
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rejected the notion that every license was an infringement, and consid-
ered such issues as availability, expense and inconvenience in determin-
ing whether there was an infringement.
210
A similar analysis was never conducted in Marshall #1, despite the fact
that a right to fish (or hunt) and trade to earn a moderate livelihood is a
very different thing from a right to fish or hunt for food, and thus the
regulations might have very different impacts. The ban on sales without
a license might seem clear, but even there one must at least ask whether
it would actually interfere in any significant way with the earning of a
"moderate livelihood", as opposed to an ability to catch fish and nothing
more. For example, one of the offences involved the imposition of a
closed season for the type of net in question at ten specified locations in
the Province of Nova Scotia and the adjacent tidal waters."
While this might be taken to interfere to a sufficient degree with a right
to fish for food, could the same be said about the ability to earn a moderate
livelihood from such activities? It might be found to be such an interfer-
ence, but the problem is that the majority never asked this question, which
is what would be required to properly apply the test for prima facie
infringement. In fact, the defence never actually led evidence showing a
primafacie infringement of the right as found by the Supreme Court, for
the simple reason that it had not been argued in this form at trial. 21 2 The
end result was that the majority, rather than apply the test to the facts of
this case, simply transferred the conclusions reached when the test was
applied in previous cases involving very different rights.
4. Summary
Three common themes run through all of the general issues discussed
above. First, in Marshall #1 the Court exhibited a tendency to leave
unstated, or poorly stated, the criteria underlying its findings on particular
aspects of the treaty right. The failure to explain how the Court reached
conclusions on elements such as beneficiaries, resources and geographic
scope made it more difficult to extrapolate from the limited facts of this
case to the other situations that would inevitably arise in negotiations.
210. Nikal, supra note 201 at paras. 97-101. The more restrictive passages from Nikal are
quoted in Marshall #2, supra note 6 at para. 27.
211. Maritime Provinces Fishery Regulations, S.O.R./93-55, s. 20, Schedule III. Mr.
Marshall was charged under a provision dealing with all species of fish. Separate close times
for fishing eels with particular gear are also provided under s. 35 of the Regulations, for more
limited locations.
212. Marshall: Prov. Ct., supra note 4 at paras. 6-7. The fight as put forward did not contain
the critical limiting factor found by the Supreme Court. The proper course here would be for
the Court to give the Appellant the opportunity at trial to introduce evidence of how this fight
was infringed.
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Second, the Court seems to have made important findings of a factual
nature based, not on the application of the appropriate tests to the facts
before them, but rather on the basis of conclusions reached when those
principles were applied to different facts." 3 Thus, the entire finding on
prima facie infringement is derived, not from an application of the
Sparrow test to the right as found here, but from the fact that regulations
of this type had been infringements when they were applied to very
different rights in other cases.214 Finally, if the changes in Marshall#2 are
any guide, much of the obscurity evident in Marshall#1 resulted from the
Court assuming that characteristics of rights defined in earlier cases
would be "read into" its decision in the present case, even if they were not
explicitly stated. As a result, the ideas of "equitable access" and entitle-
ments of others, as well as the collective and local nature of the fight, were
left unstated and discernible only by reference to the previous jurispru-
dence of the Court.
None of these problems would be as serious in a "typical" case where
the most directly interested parties are judges, legislators and lawyers,
who should be accustomed to dealing with the limited impact of particu-
lar factual findings and the importance of reading one decision with those
that went before. Here, however, the decision is necessarily targeted at a
wider audience comprising government resource managers, as well as
aboriginal and non-aboriginal users of the resource, all of whom may tend
to look to this case in isolation, and to rely more heavily on the inferences
to be drawn from the particular facts.1
1 5
Conclusions
In Marshall #1 the Supreme Court failed to provide the clear definition
of the treaty right in question, including the permissible degree of
regulation, which might have assisted in the structuring of subsequent
negotiations. This contributed to the confusion in the period that fol-
213. Ironically, this is precisely the issue the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal was addressing in
the passage dealing with the difference between peace treaties and land cession treaties, an
observation treated as an error in law by the Supreme Court. The point made by the Court of
Appeal was that one could not necessarily analogize from the results of cases based on very
different facts, even ifthe same principles were being applied in both situations. See supra note
74.
214. Similarly, the crucial finding of fact on the meaning of the word "necessaries" and the
intent of the parties to limit the right was founded in part on irrelevant findings of fact made
in earlier cases on aboriginal rights: see supra note 80.
215. So, for example, when a person from Membertou was found to be under treaty protection
while fishing in Pomquet, with nothing further to explain why, it is understandable that some
might draw broad conclusions about the geographic scope of the right. Additionally, when a
right is granted with no explicit mention of its priority or of the rights of other users, it may be
unreasonable to expect the lay reader to import unstated limits developed in other cases.
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lowed, for the decision was vague enough on central points to provide all
readers with support for their own most ambitious hopes, or worst fears.
This is not to say that the violence and intimidation on one side, and the
exaggeration of the permissive scope of the decision on the other, would
not have occurred in any event, but the manner in which the right was
defined by the Court, as distinct from the finding of the right, certainly
made productive negotiations less likely.
Marshall #2 was in part an attempt to amend or reverse portions of the
decision, while denying that this was being done, and this led inevitably
to an appearance of backtracking and "caving in" by the Court, regardless
of the content of the changes which were made. Furthermore, it has left
a muddled situation for the immediate future, with all sides in the dispute
having a decision of the Supreme Court to which they can point in support
of mutually contradictory positions on important elements of the man-
agement regime that now needs to be negotiated.2 1 6 The combined effect
of the two decisions, with their markedly different versions of the right
and its potential for regulation, is to make the successful conclusion of
negotiated settlements less rather than more likely. On the Court's own
view of what is necessary and desirable in these disputes, this is unfortu-
nate, to say the least.
The Marshall case did not involve the development of new principles
for treaty interpretation,2 7 but was concerned with the application of
those principles which have been put in place in previous cases. The
systematic and explicit application of the techniques and principles
which already exist could have avoided much of the difficulty which the
Court experienced in Marshall; the Court needs to apply the tests to the
present facts, rather than simply import the conclusions reached in
previous cases on different facts. In addition, however, the Court would
do well to consider its appropriate role as it moves into a period in which
treaty rights cases involving application of existing law should be more
common than cases giving rise to new law. Much of the difficulty
experienced in Marshall occurred when the Court was dealing with
elements of the case which required a strong factual basis, such as the
216. The substantive portions of the second decision are, of course all obiter, but clearly very
persuasive obiter that a lower court judge would be unlikely to ignore.
217. A possible exception is the treatment of regulatory powers actually agreed within a
treaty, and the resulting confusion of primafacie infringement and justification in Marshall#1,
as discussed in Part IV(2) .. ' Subjectto the Regulation': The Nature of the 'Hedge'," above. This
is by no means a definite conclusion by the Court, however, and other portions of the decision
contradict it.
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finding on primafacie infringement, and for which their findings could
send dangerous if inadvertent messages to precisely the audience that
should be anticipated. For cases with such a dense and complicated
factual content, the Court should perhaps be more willing to do as it has
done in the past and send these issues back for determination by the trial
court, where the grasp of the factual record will be more complete. 21
218. See e.g., Badger, supra note 22 at para. 98, where Cory J. stated that, despite the failure
of the Crown to lead any evidence of justification, the conservation issue was "of such
importance" that a new trial was required. The same could be said of Marshall, where the
Crown could not have led evidence regarding the legitimacy of interference with this right,
given that it was never argued by the defence in the form found by the Court. On the question
of prima facie infringement, see the text accompanying note 212.
